

# **Report of the End Term Evaluation**

Water and Sanitation Kigoma Region Project (WASKIRP)

Tanzania

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Final evaluation report

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Belgian development agency

enabel.be

This evaluation is realised as part of the cooperation between Tanzania (partner country) and
Belgium.
This report has been drawn up by independent external experts.
The opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Enabel, the Belgian Development Cooperation or the authorities of the countries concerned.

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# **Project form**

Title	Water and Sanitation Kigoma Region Project (WASKIRP)		
Project code	TAN 14 032 11		
Intervention zone	Tanzania (Kigoma region)		
Priority sector(s)	14030 - Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation		
Global Challenge(s)	Climate Change and Environment		
Partner country	Tanzania		
Partner institution(s)	Ministry of Water (MoW)		
Total budget	EUR 12,800,000		
Start date & end date of the specific agreement	11 July 2017 to 11 January 2025		
Start date & expected end date of implementation	11 July 2017 to 11 January 2025		
Impact <sup>1</sup>	To contribute toward equitable development and poverty reduction among Kigoma communities through improved access to safe and clean water supply and sanitation services		
Outcome	Outcome 1: Increased access to safe drinking water and reduced burden related to water and sanitation amongst community in Kigoma Region especially women and youth Outcome 2: Improved Hygiene Practices Outcome 3: Improved access to safe drinking water in Kigoma Region contributing to equitable development and poverty reduction.		
Outputs	Output 1.1: Community-Based Water Supply Organizations (CBWSO) are managing rehabilitated or newly constructed rural water supply schemes sustainably Output 1.2: 200,000 inhabitants have access to water through rehabilitation and extension of existing assets Output 1.3: Households have improved their hygiene practices towards water collection, storage and use Output 2.1: Households have improved their hygiene practices towards water collection, transport, storage and use		
Period covered by the evaluation	April 2021 – January 2025²		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Impact is a synonym for global objective, Outcome is a synonym for specific objective, output is a synonym for result.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> During 2020 several meetings have been organized by the Steering Committee to discuss the modification of the operational plan of the project. A revision of the operational plan jointly with the logical framework has been included and approved, to take into consideration data coming from the baseline study. Additionally, a decision to increase the budget has been taken by the Belgian Embassy (main donor) and officially validated with a letter on 23 April 2021: ref D1.3/2021/002882.

### **Project summary**

The project seeks to contribute towards equitable development and poverty reduction among Kigoma rural communities through improved access to safe and clean water supply and sanitation services. It is increasing access to safe drinking water to reduce burden related to water and sanitation amongst communities in Kigoma Region, especially women and youths, and use the water as social economic commodity through sustainable interventions on water supply and hygiene practices. The project commits to achieve the following specific objectives:

- 1. Community Owned Water Supply Organisations are managing rural water supply schemes in a sustainable way.
- 2. 200,674 inhabitants have access to safe drinking water that reduces water related burden through rehabilitation and extension of existing assets.
- 3. Households have improved their hygiene practices towards water collection, transport, storage and use.

### **Evaluation team**

The ETE work has been carried out by a team of independent consultants, Mr Hubert Cathala and Mr Stephen Mariki (National expert).

The team leader, Mr Hubert Cathala has more than 22 years of experience in leading and organising complex evaluation processes, including bilateral cooperation programs and country strategic evaluations. He has conducted more than 80 final, mid-term and end-line evaluations, ROM assignments, reviews, impact studies, analysis, feasibility studies, and assessments focussing on different thematic areas and sectors including: water and sanitation, health and rural drinking water infrastructure pro-jects. He has also worked with various NGOs, donor and research institutions, including ENABEL, AFD, SIDA, DANIDA and several other.

The national expert, Stephen Mariki has extensive professional experience in Tanzania, including in the Kigoma region, with a solid knowledge of the WASH sector and of the Tanzanian public administration in charge of this thematic in rural areas. He has conducted evaluations, as-assessments, and policy analysis and has worked closely with various Ministries in Tanzania, such as the Ministry of Water, Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism, and Tanzania Vice President's Office, as well as various research institutions and donors.

### **Abbreviations**

CBWSOs Community Based Water Supply Organisations

COVID-19 Coronavirus disease
CSO Civil Society Organisations

DAC OECD's Development Assistance Committee

ECA Contract and Administration Expert / Expert Contrat et Administration

Enhancement of Procurement Capacity of Local Government Authorities

Project

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

ETE End-Term Evaluation

EUR Euros

GDP Gross Domestic Product
GRP Glass Reinforced Plastic

HQ Headquarters

ICP Indicative Cooperation Programme
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management

JLPC Joint Local Partners Committee

KWSSA Kakonko Water Supply & Sanitation Authority

LGA Local Government Authorities
LTBWB Lake Tanganyika Bassin Water Board

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

M Million

MinFin Ministry of Finance

MoWI Ministry of Water and Irrigation (current)

MTR Mid-term Review
NAWAPO National Water Policy

NGO Non-governmental organisation NRM Natural Resources Management

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPML Oxford Policy Management Ltd
O&M Operation and maintenance

P4R Payment for Results
PC Project coordinator

PIU Project Implementation Unit

PO-RALG President's Office of Regional and Local Government

PS Private secretary

RAFI Administrative and financial responsible (Responsable administratif et

financier)

RAS Regional Administrative Secretary

RUWASA Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency
SAKIRP Sustainable Agriculture Kigoma Region Project

SC Steering Committee

SDG Sustainable Development Goal

TCRS Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS)

TFF Technical & financial file

TFP Technical and Financial Partners

ToR Terms of Reference
ToT Training of Trainers

TRA Tanzania Revenue Authority

TZS Tanzanian Schilling

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USD US Dollars

VAT Value-added tax

WUA Water User Association

WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WASKIRP Water and Sanitation Kigoma Region Project
WP Water Point (equivalent to DP Distribution Point)

WSDP Water Sector Development Programme

### 1 Background and context

#### 1.1 Context

The water sector in Tanzania faces significant challenges, particularly in rural areas, where access to safe and reliable water sources remains limited. While more than 80% of the urban population has access to basic water services (only 25% of which qualify as 'safely managed'), only 49% of rural residents do and just 3% of this water qualifies as 'safely managed'). The sector has been plagued by ageing infrastructure, weak management, and inadequate operation and maintenance (O&M) systems, resulting in a high rate of non-functional water points. Consequently, a large part of the population suffers from inadequate and intermittent water supply. Rural communities often rely on unsafe water sources such as traditional open dug wells (24%) or surface water (18%), including rivers, streams and ponds (World Bank, 2018).

Efforts under the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP) have aimed to address these gaps by promoting sustainable water supply systems, strengthening local capacity, and integrating community-based management models, such as the establishment of Community Based Water Supply Organisations (CBWSOs). However, disparities persist, and the sector requires continued investment and innovation to meet national and international goals for equitable access to clean water and sanitation.

The Kigoma Region is the westernmost of Tanzania's 31 regions and is home to approximately 2.5 million inhabitants. Historically overlooked by both the Tanzanian government and development partners, it has experienced slow development progress. Its estimated gross domestic product (GDP) stands at TZS (Tanzanian Shilling) 3,625 million (M), with a per capita income of around 55% of the national average. This places Kigoma among the poorest and most marginalised regions in the country, where poverty disproportionately impacts women.

Access to water in the Kigoma Region is generally worse than in the rest of the country. According to the WASKIRP project baseline survey, the coverage rate is less than 30% in the areas targeted by WASKIRP interventions. For the entire region, including urban centres, access to safe drinking water was 64.8%, again below the national average.

### **1.2** Overview of the Project

In such a context, the "Water and Sanitation Kigoma Region Project (WASKIRP)" was formulated as part of the Indicative Cooperation Programme (ICP 2014-2015) signed between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Government of Tanzania. Its implementation period spans from June 2017 to January 2025, with a budget of EUR (Euros) 12.8 million (M), funded by the Government of Belgium, including an EUR 800,000 contribution from the Government of Tanzania.

The project focuses on providing access to safe water, sanitation and personal health education. It involves constructing new water supply systems and rehabilitating and expanding existing ones, as many older water supply systems, built decades ago, are no longer functional. WASKIRP aims to improve the water infrastructure through targeted rehabilitation and construction efforts, while also strengthening the capacity of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASA) in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> WHO/UNICEF (2022). Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene (JMP). Accessed 05.12.2024 at https://washdata.org/data/household#I/dashboard/new.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> World Bank (2018) Reaching for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): The Untapped Potential of Tanzania's Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Sector. The World Bank. Washington, DC.

maintenance, operation, and planning. A significant focus is also placed on supporting CBWSOs by helping to establish, train, and coach these groups to ensure the long-term sustainability of water supply services. WASKIRP also builds the capacity of local government counterparts. It also intends to improve hygiene practices to break the contamination cycle from water collection points (in most cases public distribution points) to points of consumption at home. It is expected that by providing improved community water supply infrastructure and promoting safe hygiene practices, waterborne diseases will be reduced in the targeted communities.

The overall objective of WASKIRP is to contribute to equitable development and poverty reduction among Kigoma communities through improved access to safe and clean water supply and sanitation services.

The project specifically aims to increase access to safe water and sanitation services, thereby reducing the burden on communities, particularly women and youth.

WASKIRP has three main expected results:

- Sustainable management of rural water schemes: CBWSO are managing rehabilitated or newly constructed rural water supply schemes sustainably.
- **Improved access to safe drinking water**: 200,000 inhabitants have access to water through the rehabilitation and extension of existing assets.
- **Enhanced hygiene practices**: Households adopt improved hygiene practices for water collection, transportation, storage, and use, leading to better community health.

These results are achieved through various types of activities:

- Capacity building for CBWSOs and RUWASA: Training and support are provided to CBWSOs
  to establish and manage their organisations, including office setup and policy development.
  Training of Trainers (ToT) and additional training for plant managers are conducted to
  enhance RUWASA's capacity.
- Water supply infrastructure: Construction or rehabilitation of seven water infrastructure schemes using both surface and groundwater sources to ensure improved access to safe drinking water for communities.
- Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) training for improved hygiene: Hygiene practices are promoted through WASH training across different villages in the Kigoma Region, implemented in partnership with the Tanzania Red Cross.

WASKIRP targets seven sites serving fifteen villages across the six districts of Kigoma, Uvinza, Kasulu, Buhigwe, Kibondo and Kakonko. The selected sites cover mostly rural areas<sup>5</sup> with an estimated population of 200,000 based on the Tanzanian Sixth census conducted in <sup>2022</sup>.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> One of these rural areas became an urban area during the implementation period due to population growth and political changes. However, it remains a town rather than a city, meaning that, in practice, the water scheme largely retains its rural characteristics.

**Intervention Areas** Kigoma Region Kibondo Buhigwe Kasulu Rural Kigoma Rural Kigoma Urban Kasulu Urban Kazuramimba Works above 90% 2. Mkongoro 1 Works below 50% 3. Mwayaya Kakonko Uvinza Kifura 5. 25 50 km 6. Mudyanda Kidyama

Figure 1: WASKIRP project intervention areas

#### 1.3 Governance

The project is implemented by the Belgian Development Agency, Enabel, in collaboration with the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI) and RUWASA. It is anchored within the Kigoma Regional Administrative Secretariat. As the financial management system used by Tanzanian local government authorities does not comply with Belgian standards, the project activities are undertaken under the "own management" modality, applying Belgian procedures. However, Enabel supports the application of principles of co-responsibility and co-decision.

The project operates under a co-leadership arrangement, with its Steering Committee (SC) overseeing its implementation and providing strategic direction. The SC is co-chaired by the Regional Administrative Secretary and Enabel's Resident Representative. MoWI, the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) and the President's Office of Regional and Local Government (PO-RALG) also take part in the SC. The SC may invite external experts or other stakeholders as resource persons on an ad hoc basis.

A project implementation unit (PIU) is anchored at the regional level, with some staff based at the district level. A Project Manager (PM), contracted by Enabel, is responsible for ensuring that the project strategy is adhered to and that implementation is carried out within the framework of the budget and TFF (or any adjustment approved by the SC). A project coordinator is assigned from RUWASA and shares project responsibilities with the Enabel project manager, with whom he forms the project management team. The project coordinator is mandated to function as an advisor to the project manager on operational and technical issues and is also responsible for communication and coordination with the Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS), the districts and other government stakeholders.

In addition to the management team, at the regional level, the project team was initially expected to include a national senior advisor for water and sanitation, a national administrative assistant and an international advisor for social engineering on a part-time consultancy basis. At the district level, the project initially foresaw three national advisors for social engineering, based in Buhigwe, Kakonko and Uvinza, covering all six districts, along with six national extension workers based in villages or sites. In practice, this configuration was not maintained at either the regional or district level, and the team composition evolved in response to the project's challenges.

A support unit, shared across Enabel's projects in the Kigoma Region, provides services in finance, procurement, administration and logistics through an international administrative and finance officer, a national administrative and financial officer, a national procurement specialist and two or more national accountants. Finally, Enabel HQ and its representation in Dar es Salaam provided backstopping to the project.

In addition to the PIU, the project is implemented through the existing bodies responsible for water and sanitation in the region. Activities related to hygiene promotion are outsourced to non-state actors through a call for proposals. Furthermore, local governments, especially the village governments, support mobilising communities and ensuring that an appropriate environment for implementation is provided. Initially, a Regional Stakeholder Platform (RSP) comprising all major stakeholders was expected to meet at least twice a year to discuss the progress of project implementation. However, it appears never to have been functional.

In June 2019, the Government of Tanzania enacted new legislation, the Water and Sanitation Sector Act 5 of 2019. The act introduced new roles and responsibilities for various government ministries and departments involved in the provision of water and sanitation services. It prescribes the establishment of a new agency responsible for implementing all rural water supply interventions, the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASA). RUWASA has taken over roles and responsibilities that were previously under the local governments. Its main mandate is to sustainably plan, design, construct and manage water supply and sanitation services in rural parts of mainland Tanzania. This led to a shift in how WASKIRP would operate, as it had previously planned for the District Water Offices, under the local government, to be the implementing authorities. With the water sector reform, the District Managers for RUWASA became the district focal persons and linked up with the six Local Government Authorities (LGAs). These managers reported to RUWASA and were expected to ensure the coordination of project activities with the support of Enabel technical personnel.

Beyond national authorities, in rural areas, water supply and sanitation services are provided by Community Based Water Supply Organisations (CBWSOs), which have the front-line responsibility for sustaining rural water supply services on behalf of their members. CBWSOs are responsible for operating and maintaining the water supply systems on behalf of the community. They are expected to meet all operation and maintenance (O&M) costs for their water supply systems through charges levied on water consumers and to contribute to the capital cost of their systems.

CBWSOs operate under the overall coordination of RUWASA, which supports them in the management, operation and maintenance of rural water supply schemes, facilitates the planning, construction and management of rural water and sanitation projects, provides training and capacity building to community organisations, and registers and regulates the performance of these organisations.




Figure 2: Project implementation modalities at project start

### Objectives and methodology

### 2.1 Objectives

This End-Term Evaluation (ETE) aims to assess the results achieved and the overall implementation process of the WASKIRP project. It answers 13 evaluation questions that focus on the evaluation principles and criteria adopted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for development assistance and adjusted by Enabel: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. In particular, the evaluation questions explore aspects related to project effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

In addition to the OECD DAC criteria, the evaluation also aims to measure the effects of the project in relation to three cross-cutting themes prioritised by Enabel: gender equity, environment and climate change, and human rights.

The evaluation focuses on the period following the decision to extend the project, from the last quarter of 2021 to the present as envisaged by the scope outlined in the ToR (see Annex 7.1). However, it is difficult to disregard the initial stages of project implementation entirely when assessing later phases, so reference is also made to earlier stages. The evaluation covers all the areas targeted by the project.

More generally, the evaluation is intended to provide an appreciation of the strategy adopted and guidance towards more appropriate strategies. It will therefore serve to:

Support management and steering by providing in-depth analyses and proposing recommendations based on data and evidence to facilitate strategic and operational

- decision-making, and consequently, the steering of interventions. As part of the WASKIRP project's ETE, the steering support function focuses on the planned phase-out.
- Contribute to learning by analysing the development process, allowing an understanding of what works, what does not work and why, and drawing useful lessons for other interventions or the development of new policies, strategies and programmes. In particular, this involves identifying the bottlenecks that have hindered implementation progress, as well as the approaches that have facilitated it.
- Ensure accountability to the donor, partners and internal stakeholders by providing an external assessment of the progress made, the results achieved and the responsible use of the funds received.

The evaluation is intended for all project stakeholders, but, in particular, for the implementing agency, Enabel, and the Tanzanian authorities. Implementing partners are also concerned.

### 2.2 End-term evaluation methodology

The general ETE approach was participative, systemic and holistic, developed based on qualitative and quantitative indicators from the project's logical framework and the evaluation matrix, with particular attention given to the verification of data sources to ensure a high level of triangulation and guarantee the quality of the findings.

The evaluation took place in four phases: an inception phase, a data collection phase, an analysis and drafting phase, and an adjustment and restitution phase. It will conclude with the mission's closing workshop.

Based on the Terms of Reference (ToR) and the available bibliography, the preparation phase enabled the evaluation questions and priority issues to be refined, particularly by assigning them the following dimensions:

- A cognitive dimension: the question provides knowledge: what happened? What contribution has the project made?
- A normative dimension: the question enables a judgement to be made: was it sufficient? Useful? Fair?
- An instrumental dimension: the question enables the intervention being evaluated to be improved: where and when were we most successful? Why or why not? What should we do now?

This work led to the drafting of the technical report and the evaluation matrix (Annexes 1 and 5). The evaluation matrix breaks down each evaluation question into sub-questions, associates them with indicators, and specifies the corresponding sources of verification and methods of collection. The evaluation matrix was not followed mechanically but served as a checklist of topics to be addressed and as a reference for the interviews conducted by the team and, more broadly, throughout the evaluation process.

The field data collection phase was then launched. The visits were spread over eight days, following a schedule initially proposed by the project team and subsequently adjusted jointly with the evaluation team, taking into account any unforeseen circumstances that arose, such as the postponed flight arrival of the international expert by one day and the unavailability of certain stakeholders. The evaluation team comprises a senior international expert and a senior national expert.

Based on the evaluation matrix, semi-structured individual and group interviews were conducted with project stakeholders in Kigoma, the various beneficiary water scheme sites, and Dar es Salaam. These interviews were structured around open questions and themes tailored to the target audience. In Kigoma, several focus groups of between four and twelve people were also conducted with stakeholders, particularly with water scheme beneficiaries and CBWSO representatives.

Table 1: Summary of stakeholders met

Enabel	Local actors	Tanzanian authorities	Other Stakeholders
<ul> <li>Project team (Technical and administrative)</li> <li>Country Director &amp; RAFI</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Beneficiaries</li> <li>Local authorities in Mwayaya (Buhigwe), Mkongoro (Kigoma), and Kazuramimba (Uvinza).</li> <li>CBWSOs Kazuramimba and Mwayaya</li> <li>Contractor (Nangaï Manager + site engineer)</li> <li>Supervising consultancies</li> </ul>	RUWASA District     Managers and Engineers     KWASSA relevant     personnel	Belgian Embassy     Lake Tanganyika Basin Water Board (LTBWB)     Tanzania Red Cross


A more detailed list of people and institutions interviewed is presented in Annex 3. The information from the interviews and focus groups was supplemented by field observations. The analysis of documents began in phase 1 and continued throughout the ETE.

The field phase concluded with a workshop in Dar es Salaam to discuss the preliminary results of the evaluation. It was attended by representatives of the Enabel team and the Belgian Embassy. The PowerPoint used for the workshop presentation can be consulted in Annex 8.

Following the field phase, the evaluation team conducted a more in-depth analysis of the results and drafted this provisional ETE report. A feedback session will be organised via video conference with the Enabel head office team and other stakeholders once the final report has been submitted.

The evaluation process is summarised in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Evaluation process



#### 2.3 Limitations

The ETE faced some limitations and restrictions during its operation. The four main ones are:

- The unavailability of 2023 and 2024 annual results reports.
- Limited hindsight due to infrastructure having only just been completed or being on the verge of completion.
- A very limited number of stakeholders with a historical perspective.
- A lack of key documentation from the first phase of the implementation due to the loss of these documents.
- No meetings could be held with the RUWASA Regional Manager or the Oxford Policy Management Ltd, which has worked on CBWSO strengthening and will play a significant role in the phase-out.

The ToR request to focus on the post 2021 period was also complicated by the fact that, until the last day of the field work, no post-2021 annual results report and no post-2020 Joint Local Partners Committee (JPLC) report had been made available to the evaluation team.

## 3 Analysis and findings

### 3.1 Performance analysis

### 3.1.1 Relevance

RELEVANCE	Α	В	С	D

The relevance of the WASKIRP project is very good. The project aligns with national priorities and policies and leverages strategic partnerships in sustainable water supply development and sanitation strategies, including the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP). WASKIRP responds to the critical water supply needs of the local population, strengthens local capacity, and

integrates community-based management models, namely Community-Based Water Supply Organisations (CBWSOs). It addresses community needs and priorities concerning access to clean and safe water by mitigating the challenges posed by unsafe water sources, such as rivers, streams, and unprotected wells, which expose communities to waterborne diseases. The project objectives align with Belgian policies and the bilateral framework on development and social well-being.

The relevance of the WASKIRP project is very good.

Improving access to safe water corresponds to evident needs of the population and the local economy. The Kigoma Region has some of the highest water supply needs in Tanzania. According to the WASKIRP project baseline survey, the coverage rate is less than 30% in the area covered by WASKIRP interventions, compared to an overall access rate of 64.8% to safe drinking water in the Kigoma Region. This makes the project particularly relevant in this part of the country. Clean water is in high demand and will contribute both to the well-being of the population, particularly in terms of health and quality of life, and to creating a more conducive environment for economic development.

The project is fully aligned with the priorities, policies, and programmes set out by the government of Tanzania, as well as with the Belgian Water Security Strategy. Water is one of Tanzania's key development priorities, and the government, together with development partners, is investing in water supply infrastructure to address these needs. The project is aligned with the Water Sector Development Program (WSDP) II,<sup>6</sup> the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI) Sustainable Strategy,<sup>7</sup> the 2020 National Water Policy (NAWAPO),<sup>8</sup> the Payment for Results (P4R) Programme, and the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme 2018–2026. The project also contributes directly to national indicators related to the government's 2030 vision of providing basic drinking water to its people. In doing so, the project further supports Tanzania's progress towards achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, its work on hygiene aligns with Tanzania's National Sanitation Campaign. This alignment is further demonstrated by Tanzanian leadership within the project and the fact that WASKIRP is an integral part of RUWASA's work programme, with its regional manager serving as the project coordinator. These arrangements reflect commitments to aid effectiveness in international development.

A further factor which underlines the project's relevance is the fact that Enabel is the only active development partner in the region for the water sector.

Furthermore, the intervention logic is well-structured, clear, realistic, and achievable. It has three strategic objectives designed to address the most critical aspects of water supply:

Provision of the water supply infrastructure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> WSDP focusses on creating affordable, sustainable and reliable sources of water in rural settlements, township and urban areas, for both drinking and productive activities. For rural areas the WSDP cluster strategies includes:

<sup>-</sup> Rehabilitation of water facilities and construction of low-cost appropriate water sources;

<sup>-</sup> Registration of all Community Based Water Supply Organizations (CBWSOs) at District level;

<sup>-</sup> Water point mapping followed by quarterly monitoring to determine their status of functionality;

<sup>-</sup> Facilitating the supply chain of essential tools and spare parts in rural settlements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> In particular, WASKIRP provides specific support to the main bodies involved in sustaining rural water supply services which are RUWASA, CBWSOs, PO-RALG and their Regional Secretariats as well as the Ministry of Water and Irrigation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> It intends to address the lack of sustainability of rural domestic water projects with 2 objectives linked to WASKIRP:

i. Safe, reliable, adequate, sustainable and affordable domestic water supply,


ii. Effective, efficient and sustainable service delivery of water supply to rural communities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> SDG 6 aims for "universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water and sanitation and hygiene for all".

- Promotion of sustainable maintenance and operation of the water infrastructure.
- Hygienic transportation and management of water from where the point of supply to households where it is consumed.

In addition, the proposed result indicators are appropriate.





A downside in terms of hygiene and health is that the project has chosen to focus mainly on safe water provision, limiting its sanitation dimension to sensitisation and capacity building in hygienic practices, without providing improved latrines, which are generally considered an integral part of a holistic approach to water and sanitation. However, sanitation is addressed within Tanzanian strategies, meaning that, at least on the medium-term, it can be expected to be covered by parallel funding.

#### 3.1.2 Coherence

COHERENCE	Α	В	С	D

The coherence of the WASKIRP project is good. Synergies are noted between WASKIRP and other Enabel interventions, primarily with the SAKIRP project, through the construction of stone arch bridges, which facilitate movement within the area, and through the mutualisation of equipment and staff. The provision of clean water may also contribute to agricultural product transformation and related value chain development. In terms of external coherence, synergies are less prominent, but no contradictions have been identified. The project aligns with RUWASA's activities in the Kigoma Region. The development of training manuals by Oxford Policy Management Ltd (OPML) may have national effects, as the manuals have been adopted by national authorities.

The coherence of the WASKIRP project is considered good.

#### 3.1.2.1 Internal coherence

Synergies are noted between WASKIRP and its sister project, the Sustainable Agriculture Kigoma Region Project (SAKIRP). The two projects collaborated in constructing stone arch bridges to connect villages such as Nyakimwe and Mwayaya, which are separated by the Kivugura river (the source of the Mwayaya water supply scheme) in Buhigwe District, as well as villages in Kigoma Rural District. The collaboration also facilitated several river crossings, where water pipes were laid along the footpath lane of the bridges, such as on the Kaseke river near Nyabigufa in the Mkongoro water project, supplying water to villages on the opposite side of the river from the water intake.

These complementarities not only allowed contractors to deliver building materials to construction sites more easily but also contributed to the sustainability of the water project while enhancing connections between communities, supporting improved livelihoods and fostering social interaction. Additionally, complementarities with SAKIRP are evident in the fact that access to clean water and improved hygiene create a more conducive environment for agricultural product transformation and value chain development. More broadly, literature indicates that water provision contributes to increased economic returns (see impact section).

Beyond bridges, the strongest complementarities between the two projects were built around the mutualisation of personnel, including civil engineers and administrative staff, and equipment, such as offices, office equipment and vehicles.

Before 2021, synergies were also anticipated with the Natural Resources Management (NRM) project in Kigoma, as one of the key concerns regarding water resource management is erosion caused by poor agricultural practices around catchments. Water resource management was identified as a key area where the two projects could complement each other, for instance, through training on best practices and the enforcement of land, water, and environmental regulations. The NRM project was expected to serve as a facilitator of dialogue among different water users, such as farmers using irrigation water, livestock keepers and drinking water consumers, with the aim of fostering efficient Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). However, the overlap between WASKIRP and the NRM project remained limited, particularly as WASKIRP had a slow start. No synergies are recorded in project documents, and none of the stakeholders consulted could recall these initial project stages.

Similarly, synergies were also envisaged with the Enhancement of Procurement Capacity of Local Government Authorities Project (EPC-LGAP) in Kigoma. Low capacity in procurement and contract management had been identified as one of the key factors behind delays and poor implementation of WSDP sub-projects. The EPC-LGAP project was designed to build procurement and contract management capacity in 30 LGAs, with special attention given to the six LGAs in Kigoma. It was considered that EPC-LGAP would play a coaching role in procurement and contract management for WASKIRP. However, there is no mention of this role in WASKIRP project documents, nor could any stakeholder consulted confirm it. In any case, given the procurement and contract management issues WASKIRP later encountered, any coaching that may have taken place does not appear to have been effective.

During the formulation stage, the scholarship project developed by Enabel at the time, with likely follow up projects, <sup>10</sup> was also identified as a potential area for synergy, particularly in building the capacity of LGAs in specific subjects identified across different district-level projects. However, no evidence of such complementarities has been found.

#### 3.1.2.2 External coherence

Overall, there are few complementarities with external institutions, largely due to the scarcity of other organisations working in the water sector in the Kigoma Region. Nonetheless, no contradictions have been observed, so this cannot be held against the project.

It should, however, be noted that through OPML, the project developed training manuals for CBWSOs as part of efforts to build their capacities for managing WASKIRP water supply schemes. RUWASA's national headquarters sought the project's input based on its experiences in Kigoma and intends to use these manuals at a national level. To some extent, this suggests that WASKIRP has contributed to complementarities across Tanzanian rural water supply schemes and projects.

Beyond this, project reports and water sector stakeholders indicate very limited collaboration between WASKIRP and other water sector actors. Initial efforts were made to consult organisations such as TCRS, Oxfam, DRC, Water Missions, the Flemish Red Cross, and UNHCR. However, most of these agencies focused on refugee programmes within refugee camps rather than in host communities in villages surrounding the camps, leaving few opportunities for complementarities. This was further compounded by the closure of most refugee camps as the project progressed, leading these agencies to scale down their activities.

Some interactions were noted with the Flemish Red Cross, which collaborates with the Tanzania Red Cross Society, a WASKIRP implementing partner. These interactions mainly concerned water treatment systems, but no clear outcomes from these engagements have been documented.

#### 3.1.3 Effectiveness

EFFECTIVENESS A B C D

The WASKIRP project's effectiveness is good. Seven water supply schemes have been built or rehabilitated and are functional, despite a few remaining snags and last-minute completion work. Over 200,000 people benefit from improved access to clean water. Six CBWSOs have been established, and their offices have been completed. Sanitation and hygiene promotion activities have been undertaken in 22 targeted villages across the region.

Despite these successes, some weaknesses remain. In particular, the capacity for operating and maintaining water supply schemes still requires strengthening. CBWSOs need further capacity building, and the impact of hygiene promotion efforts remains limited.

The WASKIRP project's effectiveness is qualified as good. Most activities have been carried out and have yielded satisfactory results, though there are issues regarding quality and consolidation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Enabel regularly develops scholarship projects in Tanzania aimed at fostering education and skills development. The current programme, Wezesha Binti, which focuses on empowering youth, especially girls and young women, offers such scholarships. Another programme was ongoing at the time of WASKIRP formulation, though details on its exact content have not been forthcoming.

The most prominent outputs are related to result 2, "Rehabilitation and extension of existing water supply systems", with the construction or rehabilitation of seven water schemes (see the table below).

Table 2: Result 2 - Outputs

Outputs	Beneficiaries	Type of intake and / or # distribution points	Status
Kazuramimba water scheme (Uvinza district)	40,000 (Immediate service : 31,551)	Ground water (bore hole)  35 distribution points  32 individual connexions	97%
Mkongoro 1 gravity-fed- scheme (and Bweru Tank)	53,500	Surface water intake  134 distribution points	Bweru Tank complete 100% and handed over to RUWASA
Mwayaya water supply scheme (Buhigwe district)	19,000 (2,700 families)  160 families have individual connections	Surface water intake 30 distribution points	100%
Kakonko-Kiziguzigu water supply scheme	51,280 (direct beneficiaries 36,461??)	Ground water (bore hole)	99% complete
Kifura water scheme (Kibondo district)	15,700 (immediate service 12,386)	Surface water intake	90% complete (50 waterpoints with 27 operational).  The distribution system is part of the government funding and is in the stages of contract awarding (risk for follow up on completion).
Mudyanda/Nyansha - Nyantare water scheme (Kasulu district)	29,000	Ground water (bore hole)	100% compete and accepted (30/06/2024)
Kidyama water scheme (Kasulu district)	29,000	Ground water (bore hole)	75%. No distribution system

In relation to result 1, "Sustainable management of water supply systems", six CBWSOs have been established, and their offices have been completed. All six CBWSOs have developed statutes, rules, and regulations, set up a water board with nine members, opened a bank account, and begun generating resources, with some having collected over TZS 100 M (EUR 37,000). Training has been delivered in customer care, financial management, record keeping, revenue forecasting, tariff structuring, operation and maintenance, water point sanitation, and water and sanitation promotion strategies.

The project has also supported RUWASA in organising Community of Practice meetings, which serve as accountability and learning forums that bring together all CBWSOs in a district, not only those

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Water fees are the main source of CBWSOs' income. A unit of water (1 m³) through an individual connection costs TZS 2,000, whereas at a public distribution point, filling a 20-litre bucket costs TZS 40. Fees are collected through a cellphone-based technology and go directly to the CBWSO's bank account. According to government guidelines, CBWSOs need permission from RUWASA to use the money on their account.

targeted by the project for water system construction or rehabilitation. Additionally, through a service contract with Oxford Policy Management Ltd (OPML), WASKIRP produced training modules and manuals based on a training needs assessment. The modules cover the function of CBWSOs and the knowledge and skills required for CBWSOs to fulfil their roles. Gender mainstreaming and water resource protection were also considered.

Further work has been undertaken on catchment protection and management for surface water schemes in collaboration with the Lake Tanganyika Bassin Water Board (LTBWB). This has included strengthening CBWSO capacities in catchment protection around surface water schemes and defining areas where human activities are prohibited. In some cases, agricultural producers were expelled from the vicinity of the water source, as in Mwayaya. Reforestation plans have been developed for some catchments and trees have also been planted in some catchment areas, though it has not been possible to determine the exact number and locations.

In relation to result 3, "Improved hygiene practices", the Tanzania Red Cross Society (TRCS) implemented sanitation and hygiene activities in 22 targeted villages across the region from 1 September 2021 to March 2023. Hygiene sensitisation sessions and promotion campaigns have been conducted to encourage safe hygiene practices and water safety at various stages, including water collection, transport, storage, and household use. This includes handwashing practices, household drinking water safety, the importance of improved latrines, and the assembly and use of "tippy taps" at communal water service points. Door-to-door hygiene promotion campaigns reached 2,070 households, while 21 outdoor and 23 indoor community hygiene promotion meetings were conducted with 5,498 participants to promote the use of improved latrines (Sato toilets) and proper handwashing. Sanitation promotion materials, including Sato toilets, cement bags, and PVC pipes, were distributed to 23 village sanitation committees. A total of 190 villagers, water sector stakeholders, and project staff—including RUWASA officers, CBWSO leaders, hygiene promoters, and village leaders—participated in capacity-building sessions. The hygiene component also included training community health workers, volunteers, village leaders, and 46 village artisans to facilitate the construction and installation of improved latrines and the establishment and training of 23 community sanitation committees and 48 WASH clubs.

Despite these outputs, it must be underlined that the project's effectiveness is undermined by several weaknesses in output quality:

- Most infrastructure has only recently been completed or is still in the final stages at the time
  of the ETE. Various systems are not yet fully functional for both technical and social reasons,
  with some families in Kazuramimba refusing to pay water costs, leading to water point
  closures by RUWASA. In Kidyama, the distribution system remains unbuilt.
- In the case of Kidyama, the distribution system will only materialise thanks to a commitment by the Tanzanian government to secure the necessary resources. As a result, there is currently no way to assess the efficiency of the capacity-building activities undertaken for the operation and management of water supply schemes. However, after the evaluation's visit to the Kigoma region, the project reported that the contract for the distribution network had been awarded and that construction of the distribution system was planned to start within 2 months. Good follow-up will be required to minimise the risk of the construction never appearing.

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<sup>12</sup> The surface areas involved are relatively negligible, however, and cannot be considered to represent a significant disadvantage to farmers.

- CBWSOs have been established but remain unconsolidated, lacking both administrative and technical capacity, resulting in weak management of water schemes. They can only be considered partially functional. The technical assistance and support provided to local actors—including CBWSOs, RUWASA, ward and village authorities—has been insufficient to consolidate their activities, despite inadequate water scheme management being identified as one of the key factors contributing to non-functional water systems. CBWSOs still require significant support in governance, human resources, data management, sustainable financing, developing and implementing effective operations and management plans, and water protection. No CBWSO appears to have a proper business plan in place, and their offices lack equipment beyond basic furniture. They also have very limited registers, if any, and do not possess vehicles.
- Very limited work has been undertaken on catchment protection. Only Mwayaya CBWSOs has been involved.
- The exact effect of the hygiene-related activities has not been monitored and remains unclear.

In addition, initially planned awareness raising activities on HIV/AIDS were not undertaken. However, the ETE team agrees that deprioritising these activities was justified given the many other issues the project had to address.

More broadly, capacity-building activities were stretched over a long period and delivered in the absence of functional water systems. As a result, CBWSOs and other beneficiaries have assimilated very little, leading to low effectiveness in capacity building.

Furthermore, several activities mentioned in project reports after 2021 never materialised:

- The Zeze water supply system was ultimately abandoned after extensive studies due to the lack of viable water sources.
- Reports also indicated that the project intended to introduce an electronic data collection
  and transfer system for water point mapping and monitoring in the Kigoma Region. This
  system was meant to replace the paper-based data collection method, improve database
  updates, reduce errors, and enhance information flow between RUWASA district offices, the
  region, and RUWASA headquarters. However, due to delays, lack of time and insufficient
  financial resources for infrastructure, the initiative was deprioritised in favour of water
  supply infrastructure construction and never materialised.
- Reports also mention planned activities to promote "decent jobs" within CBWSOs, but no such work was undertaken.

#### 3.1.4 Efficiency

EFFICIENCY A B C D

The WASKIRP project's efficiency is problematic. The project closed 2.5 years after the initially planned date and required a 50% budget increase to achieve its results. It ultimately provided clean water at a relatively high per capita cost compared to Tanzanian standards. The causes of inefficiency were multiple. Beyond various issues affecting the construction of water supply systems, including VAT exemption delays, weak contractor management capacity, poor design, inflation, Belgian budgetary revisions, staff turnover, and the impact of COVID-19, quality at entry was very low. Further cross-cutting efficiency constraints beyond water supply scheme construction were also noted, including politicisation, weak financial and administrative

management, limited initial backstopping, and challenges posed by water sector reform. Additionally, tensions generated by these problems, along with delays and cost increases, created a downward spiral of discontent, leading to a weak partnership and a blame-and-shame context that further complicated implementation.

The WASKIRP project's efficiency is problematic. The project closed 2.5 years after the initially planned date, with Enabel having to increase its budgetary contribution by 50% and Tanzania, considering the Kidyama distribution system, by 100%.

Even after the project's 18-month extension until January 2024 and a EUR 4 M cost increase agreed in 2021, infrastructure costs continued to rise, albeit to a lesser extent, and delays persisted. As a result, a second one-year extension was necessary to allow the project's implementation period to run until January 2025. This second extension involved an additional increase in the Tanzanian contribution of EUR 900,000 to fund the Kidyama water distribution system. Moreover, as the project was extended, it became increasingly focused on completing infrastructure, while all other activities were reduced to a minimum.

Although the project is officially closed as of the end of January 2025, a phase-out has been integrated into Enabel's 2023–2027 Tanzania Country Portfolio to ensure activity consolidation through further capacity building in relation to O&M. This represents a relatively limited additional cost of EUR 400,000 but allows for an additional three years of work beyond the already significant 2.5-year extension of implementation.

#### 3.1.4.1 Water supply scheme construction and rehabilitation challenges

Indeed, water supply scheme construction and rehabilitation continued to face numerous challenges from 2022 onwards. Several key issues can be highlighted:

- VAT exemptions were either not granted or were significantly delayed, hindering procurement and slowing or suspending construction work. In October 2020, TRA Kigoma decided no longer to grant VAT exemption as stipulated in the specific agreement signed between Tanzania and Belgium. Although the situation was unblocked in August 2021 (by the Private Secretary, PS, for Treasury), in March 2022, TRA Kigoma again decided to reject all VAT exemption requests. A personal intervention of the PS for treasury was required again to unblock the situation in August 2022. Initially, some contractors agreed to continue working during these periods using their stocks, but in 2022, when VAT exemption was withheld for eight months, all works contracts were suspended at one point. Besides, some VAT exemption certificates expired, compounding delays.
- Design deficiencies were noted both at the start of the project and throughout its implementation, leading to redesign and time-consuming contract amendments.
- Weak contractor management capacity and non-compliance with administrative processes, including a lack of knowledge of donor procedures and poorly completed documents, led to the repetition of administrative processes. Cash flow problems also emerged, as contractors were unable to pre-finance works and requested advance payments that were difficult for Enabel to grant.
- Low response levels to drilling and construction bids, in some cases requiring the relaunch of tenders.

- The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis led to price increases, generating conflicts with contractors.
- The COVID-19 period also affected the project by forcing work suspensions due to health protocols, shelving or slowing down some activities, and negatively impacting contractor cash flow. In several instances, the project accepted to support contractors lacking cash flow in acquiring construction materials.
- Belgian budgetary reforms affected the Enabel Tanzania office, likely reducing its capacity to follow projects.
- Claims for delay compensation further burdened on the contractors, leading to additional delays, sometimes culminating in site abandonment or the failure to maintain key staff onsite
- Procurement difficulties for certain materials, including construction materials, equipment, and vehicles, particularly when imported.
- Complicated access to work zones, especially during the rainy season (October to April).
- Adverse climate conditions making work impossible at certain times (as was the case with inundations).
- Delays in infrastructure works led to supervising consultants suspending their work.
- The accumulated delays and implementation issues led to Enabel headquarters intervening. This was welcome, as it allowed for tackling the problems faced by the project more effectively. However, consulting at multiple levels—Kigoma, Dar es Salaam, and Dodoma—to resolve issues, although it can be necessary, is time-consuming.
- Instances of vandalism, sometimes politically motivated during election periods, and material theft, particularly pipes. In Kazuramimba, for instance, meters were stolen, and some infrastructure was damaged.
- The transfer of water supply service delivery responsibilities from local government to RUWASA, following the 2019 Water Supply and Sanitation Act, initially slowed down processes.
- Potential issues related to land were not given sufficient attention at formulation stage and
  in several instances, resistance over land matters delayed implementation, including
  Kidyama, Kifura, Mkongoro, and Nyakimwe in Buhigwe, where landowners refused to allow
  construction to encroach on their gardens. In Kazuramimba, where an additional borehole
  was planned, the landowner refused to allow drilling.
- The decision to abandon the Zeze water supply scheme was taken late in the project (March 2022), resulting in wasted efforts before reaching this decision.
- Delays in construction often led to additional storage fees.

Moreover, WASKIRP's capacity to address delays was also weakened by poor monitoring of worksite progress by the project staff and RUWASA in the initial years of the project. Table 3 summarises the issues faced by the various water supply systems during their construction or rehabilitation, along with the final cost per beneficiary.

Table 3: Issues face during construction and cost per capita

Table 3: Issues face during cons Water scheme	Cost*	Issues faced
Kazuramimba water scheme	EUR 888,000 for 40,000 <sup>13</sup> beneficiaries: EUR 22 /capita	<ul> <li>Design modification in course of project</li> <li>Unsatisfactory assessment of excavation route (presence of rock)</li> <li>VAT exemption</li> <li>Contract suspension</li> <li>Scarcity of material (i.e. aggregate) during rainy season</li> <li>Shipping challenges for imported materials due to Covid 19</li> </ul>
Mkongoro 1 gravity-fed- scheme (and Bweru Tank)	EUR 1,120,000 + EUR 35,000 (Force account) for 53,500 beneficiaries: EUR 21 /capita	<ul> <li>VAT exemption</li> <li>Weak contractor performance and termination</li> <li>Incomplete design and subsequent design deficiencies and errors</li> <li>Low rainy season access and building conditions</li> <li>Conflict with contractor</li> <li>Instances of vandalism or stealing</li> <li>Changing river context and increased siltation of the river</li> </ul>
Mwayaya water supply scheme (Buhigwe district)	EUR 965,000 for 19,000 beneficiaries: EUR 51 /capita	<ul> <li>VAT exemption</li> <li>Procurement issues (lack of availability of material)</li> <li>Low rainy season access and building conditions</li> <li>Weak contractor performance (lack of cash flow and purchase of low-quality material, rejected by the project)</li> </ul>
Kakonko-Kiziguzigu water supply scheme	EUR 1,870,000 (jointly funded by RUWASA through Force account) for 51,280 beneficiaries: <sup>14</sup> EUR 36 /capita	<ul> <li>Lack of supervision from the local partner RUWASA in a context of direct implementation</li> <li>Quality challenges due to local contractor used via direct execution</li> <li>Issues of water quality emerged after construction had begun</li> </ul>
Kifura water scheme (Kibondo district)	EUR 1,200,000 for 15,700 beneficiaries: <sup>15</sup> EUR 76/capita	Electricity challenges (Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited - Tanesco) due to weak voltage     VAT exemption     Weak or absent CBWSO at initial stages     Initial design weaknesses
Mudyanda/Nyansha - Nyantare water scheme (Kasulu district)	EUR 82,000 for 29,000 beneficiaries: EUR 3 /capita (but this was a rehabilitation and only very partially funded by Enabel)	
Kidyama water scheme (Kasulu district)	EUR 632,000 for 29,000 beneficiaries: EUR 22 /capita (but will rise above 50 with the Tanzanian contribution)	Ownership transfer from RUWASA to KWSSA leading to coordination challenges     VAT exemption

<sup>1313</sup> Beneficiaries at immediate service: 31,551

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Beneficiaries at immediate service: 36,461

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Beneficiaries at immediate service: 12,386

Water scheme	Cost*	Issues faced	
		Coronavirus	
		<ul> <li>Low contractor performance</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Initial design weaknesses</li> </ul>	

<sup>\*</sup> As recorded in 12th JPLC, 17th July 2024

It should be noted that the Tanzanian authorities' decision to finance the Kidyama distribution system (estimated at EUR 800,000 – EUR 900,000) represents an almost doubling of Tanzania's counterpart contribution, although this has not been registered in the project budget.

#### 3.1.4.2 Quality at entry

Beyond challenges related to civil engineering works, the most significant issue faced by WASKIRP was weak quality at entry. The project was identified following only a ten-day formulation mission, including just three days of field visits. This was insufficient to achieve its stated goal of acquiring a "good overview of water scheme infrastructures and management issues".

As a result, the original project design was based on a flawed assessment of the actual situation and required significant adaptation. Key inaccuracies or approximations included:

- Water sources: Flow of rivers and streams identified as water sources had been severely
  affected by climate change, inappropriate land use, soil erosion, overexploitation, and
  infrastructure development, including dams and weirs. As a result, water sources had
  declined significantly from the levels recorded in existing registers, and in some cases, they
  had dried up completely. Alternative sources had to be identified through an additional
  survey, which in some cases pointed to the need for groundwater extraction, requiring
  drilling operations that significantly delayed construction and required design revisions.
- Deterioration of existing water schemes: Most of the water schemes initially identified for rehabilitation were in far worse condition than originally assessed. As a result, the project had to move from rehabilitation to new construction, requiring a total redesign of the planned engineering works.
- Village development: Once implementation began, it became clear that the beneficiary population was larger and more dispersed than initially estimated. This increased the required network coverage and capacity, necessitating extensive redesigns and significantly higher costs.
- Water User Association (WUA) capacity: WUA's were either non-existent or far weaker than anticipated.

As a result of the elements identified above, the project had to reorganise its activities and objectives to address technical constraints, including shifting from surface water intakes to boreholes, constructing new infrastructure rather than rehabilitating existing ones, and expanding networks. This required completely new technical designs and a budget review. Although the reorientation and reorganisation actions were justified and relevant, the rising costs associated with these adjustments made it impossible to achieve the objectives set out in the original Specific Agreement within the planned budget.

In these circumstances, the Joint Local Partner Committee (JLPC) initially agreed in November 2018 to reduce the number of targeted villages from twenty-six to fifteen, aiming to serve an estimated population of 125,000 according to 2019 figures. The number of targeted water schemes was reduced from eleven to six, with one per district, to accommodate adjustments in the infrastructure budget.

However, towards the end of 2020, the Kingdom of Belgium committed additional resources amounting to EUR 4 M to bridge the deficit. This was approved in 2022, allowing WASKIRP to finance the construction of six new water supply schemes and rehabilitate one, thereby compensating for the earlier downscaling. The project maintained its 15 target villages and restored total population coverage to over 200,000 beneficiaries.

Enabel has highlighted the lack of historical data from responsible institutions as one of the explanations for the design problems met by the project. However, this should have triggered much more detailed preparatory studies at the formulation stage. Whereas, in practice, only three days of field visits were undertaken as part of the formulation process. It should also be recognised that design problems persisted even after the deficiencies in the initial assessment were discovered, implying that either insufficient attention was given to infrastructure design or that weak engineering capacities played a role.

#### 3.1.4.3 Relatively high costs per capita

In addition to the fact that the project's initial budget was increased by over 50% to serve a similar number of beneficiaries, it must also be underlined that, during project formulation, an average per capita hardware cost of TZS 30,000 was calculated, with cost per capita being one of the water supply system selection criteria. This was well below WSDP requirements, which set a maximum per capita cost of TZS 90,000 (EUR 34). However, with the changed context and related water system design modifications, linked to the weak initial planning at formulation stage, costs per capita rose significantly. Table 3 indicates that the Mwayaya, Kidyama (considering the Tanzanian counterpart contribution), and Kifura water schemes, and to a lesser extent the Kakonko-Kiziguzigu water supply scheme, have significantly exceeded this limit. This indicates that the WASKIRP project's cost-effectiveness is low. This is further exacerbated when taking into account the remaining capacity-building activities planned for the phase-out.

#### 3.1.4.4 Cross-cutting efficiency limits, beyond water supply scheme construction

Beyond construction costs and civil engineering challenges, the high level of staff turnover was also an issue, with the project ultimately having four project managers and three Enabel country directors, along with gaps between their periods of activity. This has resulted in duplication of efforts, a loss of historical perspective regarding the reasons underlying project orientations and reorientations, and challenges in relation to stakeholder management.

Further complications arose due to the politicisation of certain project activities. The project was, at times, instrumentalised for political purposes, leading to some communities being mobilised against it, which further complicated implementation. In July 2023, the Minister of Water conducted a field visit. during which he was confronted by communities. This led to significant political attention and heightened tensions between political authorities and the project. The Embassy had to intervene to manage the situation. Monthly high-level meetings between the Ministry, the Embassy, and Enabel were subsequently established, although these became less frequent over time. Weekly meetings with RUWASA were also introduced.

Issues related to poor administrative and financial management and a lack of proper archiving were also identified in 2022. The Court of Audit considered that the project's overall performance in the audit was not satisfactory, noting knowledge gaps in public procurement procedures at the project level and certain management lapses. This led to the replacement of the international administrative and finance officer, as well as the project manager, and resulted in much greater (and welcome)

involvement of Enabel's Dar es Salaam representation in project oversight and management following the transfer of management decisions to the Country Director.

It appears that the backstopping support that Enabel HQ and its Dar es Salaam representation were expected to provide to the project may not have been sufficient in WASKIRP's early stages, although it became much more significant as problems emerged. At certain points, more intensive support for project implementing partners in public procurement processes could likely have improved project progress. The lack of capacity in large public procurements was identified as a risk as early as 2019 and was supposed to be mitigated through Procurement Backstopping Missions, but aside from one mission in May 2019, no further backstopping missions took place until the end of 2021 (30 months later). The Covid-19 pandemic is one of the factors that limited the possibility of conducting backstopping missions, as well as the budgetary revisions undergone by the Belgian government during the implementation period.

Beyond the rotation of personnel in charge of administrative and financial issues, another challenge was that no international Contract and Administrative Expert (ECA)<sup>17</sup> was based in Tanzania until 2022 or 2023. This decision resulted from an assessment that considered the Tanzania portfolio limited and relatively easy to manage. Consequently, it was overseen from Burundi and/or Brussels by so-called "Flying ECAs", who supervised the work undertaken by local administrative experts remotely. However, this proved insufficient. Indeed, Enabel now equips all its countries with an International ECA, as their absence often leads to administrative management challenges, as was the case in Tanzania with WASKIRP.

Moreover, as project delays accumulated, conflicts escalated, the desire to pin responsibilities on people increased, and aspects of the project became instrumentalised. Solidarity between implementation partners diminished. This created a downward spiral of discontent, leading to a weakened partnership, further politicisation, and a blame-and-shame dynamic that further complicated implementation.

It should also be noted that there are indications that RUWASA's current staffing levels do not allow for sufficient presence at the field level to conduct the level of monitoring and support that Enabel had expected. At certain times, LTWB was also unable to provide personnel to support WASKIRP activities.

Additionally, the water sector reform that took place during the project's implementation period, through the 2019 Water Supply and Sanitation Act, significantly altered the institutional framework of the water sector. The establishment of RUWASA, which took over the implementation of water and sanitation projects from LGAs, disrupted project institutional arrangements and created an environment that was not conducive to efficiency, as all stakeholders, both Tanzanian and international, required time to adapt to the new framework.

It should also be noted that it proved difficult to identify an NGO with adequate capacity to implement the hygiene and sanitation component in the Kigoma Region.

Finally, there were periods, such as the beginning of 2024 (until the extension approval on 20/03/24), when the project was awaiting an extension which was not approved before the planned closure

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Beyond involvement of the Dar es Salaam representation in project overview and management, complementary direct implementation support from an HQ water expert was provided with two assistance missions of two to three weeks over the period May to July 2024.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 17}$  From the French acronym: Expert Contrats et Administration

date, leading to a gap between project implementation periods. During such periods, with no valid framework in place, the project was effectively partially suspended.

#### 3.1.5 Sustainability

SUSTAINABILITY	Α	В	O	D

The WASKIRP project's sustainability is problematic. Only limited results have been achieved in relation to the operation, management, and maintenance of infrastructure. CBWSO capacity to manage facilities still needs to be strengthened. Ownership remains limited. RUWASA requires further capacity building to effectively fulfil its mandate in supporting CBWSOs. Spare parts supply chains are poorly developed, and private sector involvement in the sector remains low. Catchment protection is inadequate, and the financial sustainability of water supply schemes is weak. Although an upcoming phase-out project may help address some of these issues, the ETE considers that its resources are insufficient to comprehensively resolve them.

EQ8: What is the likelihood of the maintenance in the time of the results achieved, including infrastructure and services?

The WASKIRP project's sustainability is problematic.

As the project draws to a close with a 2.5-year delay, it has completed its physical infrastructure to a satisfactory degree. However, very limited results have been achieved in relation to the operation, management, and maintenance of the infrastructure. The project has been largely focused on infrastructure, with insufficient attention given to operation and maintenance. Moreover, the capacity-building efforts that have been undertaken have been irregular and too stretched out over time, preventing them from effectively achieving their intended results.

#### 3.1.5.1 Weak water supply system operation and maintenance capacities

There is very limited hindsight to assess the robustness of the results achieved and the current capacity to manage the water supply schemes, however, a set of issues indicate that it is limited:

- CBWSO capacity to manage facilities still needs to be strengthened. Their lack of skills and insufficient technical capacity hinder the proper management of water supply. They require support in governance, human resources, data management, sustainable financing, the development and implementation of effective operations and management plans, and water protection. Although there is evidence of community willingness to pay for water services, the amount beneficiaries are willing to contribute is very low, leading to low tariffs and consequently weak CBWSO budgets, which compromise financial sustainability.
- Ownership remains limited, as beneficiary participation has not been sufficient during the
  water system planning stage, and work on water system operation and maintenance has
  been too limited. The project's ultimately top-down approach to infrastructure design can
  be considered another factor contributing to the observed lack of ownership of the
  infrastructure and the weak management capacities that now threaten its sustainability.
  These challenges are further compounded by insufficient civil engineering support and the
  lack of social engineering from formulation stage onwards.
- In Kazuramimba, only 4 of the 35 distribution points were functioning during the ETE as most of them have been shut down by RUWASA due to conflicts around water payments. The basis of the conflict is unclear. Some people declare that water meters are not accurate,

- whereas others consider that they work well and that declaring them as faulty only serves as an excuse for people who do not want to pay.
- No business plans have been developed, meaning tariffs do not correspond to actual costs, and CBWSOs have no clear vision for the development of their organisations. Furthermore, their autonomy in financial management and planning is restricted. The water fees they collect are directly credited to their bank accounts through a digitalised system, and, in accordance to government guidelines, require RUWASA's approval to be disbursed.
- RUWASA requires further capacity building to ensure it can effectively fulfil its mandate in supporting CBWSOs.
- Spare parts supply chains remain poorly developed, and private sector involvement in the sector is minimal. Currently, CBWSO go to RUWASA for spare parts.
- Catchment protection is not consolidated in Mkongoro and Kifura, and to a lesser extent, in Mwayaya. In protecting watersheds for schemes supplied by surface water, the project has worked with the Lake Tanganyika Basin Water Board, the government entity legally mandated to protect water resources in this part of Tanzania. This entity has supported the project in demarcating boundaries around at least some catchment areas and preparing reforestation plans. However, it is unclear how comprehensive this work has been across all catchment areas, particularly for the three-surface water-fed systems. Moreover, catchment protection measures implemented appear to be very limited. Only Mwayaya has actively addressed this issue, primarily by prohibiting agricultural activities in the vicinity of the intake and upstream watercourse. Much more work would be needed to ensure that water resources have been protected. To the project's discharge, it must be noted that working on catchment protection was difficult due to the absence of water, which, in most cases, was only made available at the end of the project.

#### 3.1.5.2 Financial sustainability

Regarding financial sustainability, CBWSOs perceive the solution to their low revenue levels as increasing the number of individual connections, which are expected to generate more income than public distribution points. A unit of water (1 m³)¹8 through an individual connection costs TZS 2,000, whereas at a public distribution point, filling a 20-litre bucket costs TZS 40. Theoretically, the price of water remains the same, but individual connections typically result in greater water use. Additionally, individual connections eliminate the need for a water point "manager". It also appears that with public water points, a significant number of buckets go unpaid, as the water manager cannot be present at the water point at all times. However, it is unclear how significantly the number of individual connections will increase.

CBWSOs indicate that there is demand for individual connections (300 applications in Kazuramimba for example), but the setup costs remain high. The baseline survey found that 72% of households earn less than TZS 100,000 per month, with less than 1% earning an average monthly income of TZS 200,000. Establishing an individual connection can cost up to TZS 400,000 if the household is far from the network, although closer connections are significantly cheaper. Even the TZS 10,000 application fee alone discourages some households.

This cost issue is further highlighted by the fact that water is relatively expensive. Almost one-third of households (31.5%) report using between 101 and 140 litres of water (5–7 buckets) per day. At

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> 1000 litres.

public water point prices (TZS 40 per bucket),<sup>19</sup> this amounts to a monthly cost of TZS 7,200, likely exceeding 10% of an average household's income. The project's baseline study found that only 24% of households were willing to pay more than TZS 2,000 per month for improved water quality, while only 8.2% said they would be willing to pay more than TZS 6,000 per month.

#### 3.1.5.3 The phase-out project

The EUR 438,000 phase-out project included in Enabel's 2023–2027 Country Portfolio for Tanzania may still support the consolidation of operation and maintenance aspects. This includes business plan development, estimation of recurrent costs (spare parts, labour requirements, administrative and transport costs), water price setting, revenue collection management, financial and human resource management, monitoring, reporting and auditing protocols, operations and maintenance of water supply infrastructure, customer relations, records and stock management, and general water sector stakeholder capacity. This intervention has an execution period of up to three years and foresees support for RUWASA and CBWSOs through a service provider such as OPML. However, much remains to be done, and the evaluation team does not believe the financial resources currently allocated to the phase-out will be sufficient. The current phase-out document foresees three-day in situ workshops for each CBWSO, whereas the ETE mission believes that much longer-term support is needed. Such support will be difficult to provide with the currently planned financial resources.

Another concern regarding the phase-out project is that no clear document outlining its exact scope existed two weeks before the project's closure. Even more concerning is that discussions between Enabel and RUWASA regarding the phase-out appear to have been limited to exchanges between the Enabel project manager and the RUWASA project coordinator. The project coordinator could not be met, but a phone conversation indicated that his knowledge of the phase-out project was very limited.

Beyond RUWASA, none of the people met appeared aware of the details of any take over process; and many were not even aware of the fact that the project was closing.

#### 3.1.5.4 Further sustainability preoccupations

Further preoccupations concerning sustainability include the fact that, at the time of the ETE mission, several unresolved physical issues remained in relation to the water supply schemes. These include leaks in various schemes, water pressure issues in Kakonko, water silting in Mkongoro, and beneficiary refusal to pay for water, leading to the closure of distribution points in Kazuramimba. Although the team was working to resolve most of these problems, it seemed unlikely that all of them could be addressed within the remaining two weeks. This was especially true as the primary focus was on completing the remaining infrastructure in Kidyama and Mkongoro and officially handing over various schemes to RUWASA, including the Kazuramimba water tank.

In conclusion, the project's sustainability framework considers the availability of funds for operations and maintenance, the sustainable management of water resources, community-based maintenance skills supported by the government, and links to spare parts supply chains as foundational pillars for sustainable rural water supply services. None of these criteria currently appear to be robust within the water supply schemes funded by WASKIRP.

#### **3.1.6** Impact

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> A bucket contains 20 litres of water.

IMPACT A B C D

The WASKIRP project's impact is good. Over 200,000 people have gained improved access to safe and clean water, with likely, though unquantified and unconfirmed, positive effects on the time and effort required to fetch water, the prevalence of waterborne diseases, and economic development. The impact on hygiene and waterborne diseases would likely have been maximised with stronger efforts in sanitation infrastructure, particularly latrines.

The WASKIRP project's impact is qualified as good.

It has enabled over 200, 000 people, <sup>20</sup> from a 2015 baseline of 76,448 people with adequate access <sup>21</sup> to water, to gain increased access to clean and safe drinking water, thus fulfilling one of its three main objectives. As previously explained, there is no hindsight regarding the sustainability of this result and, consequently, its long-term benefits. However, it can be expected that access to clean water will improve the living conditions of beneficiaries because:

- on the basis of the experience of other water supply projects, the time and effort required to fetch water will be reduced. In most cases, both women and children are responsible for this task, and time savings can be used for other productive activities, such as attending school or engaging in income-generating activities. The baseline study indicates that almost half (47.9%) of respondents previously spent between 20 minutes and one hour fetching water from water points or public taps, while 25.7% spent over three hours. These figures are assumed to have improved, although no monitoring has taken place to confirm the current situation. This is further complicated by the fact that not all water supply systems are yet fully functional, and most have only recently begun distributing water. Additionally, the amount of time saved depends not only on the availability of water points but also on their functionality, as intermittent water services can still result in significant waiting times. This effect, therefore, needs to be monitored over time.
- The baseline study also found that 56.7% of households walked one to two kilometres to
  fetch water, while only 23.4% walked less than one kilometre. This situation affects all
  women and particularly schoolgirls, who are often responsible for fetching water for their
  households. Although no direct quantification has been possible, improved access to water
  will free up time and effort for them to dedicate to other activities, particularly their studies.
- The burden of waterborne diseases is expected to decrease, particularly when combined with improved hygiene practices. Already, water quality monitoring indicates that water quality is satisfactory. However, currently, the project's impact on hygiene beyond water quality has not been monitored and is probably not as strong as initially hoped. Indeed, waterborne disease prevalence depends on multiple factors beyond access to clean water. Moreover, the absence of support for sanitation infrastructure will constrain the project's impact on reducing water-related diseases. Furthermore, the limited capacity-building efforts related to hygiene make it likely that hygiene practices have not been well assimilated.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> An estimate of 210,000, above the initial target has been made by the project.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> According to Tanzanian standards, one public water point should serve a maximum of 250 people within a radius of 400 meters to be adequate. However, the population having adequate access to a water point does not necessary benefit from safe drinking water because of intermittent supply, pollution due to absence of appropriate water treatment and weak management.

- Although this is not yet observable in WASKIRP beneficiary communities, due to the quite recent arrival of clean water, the availability of safe drinking water as a social commodity will stimulate new economic initiatives. Several studies confirm the positive cross-cutting effects of clean water on economic development. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has found that for every USD 1 invested in water and sanitation, at least USD 4 is returned in increased productivity.<sup>22</sup>
- Public buildings, such as schools, health centres, and markets, will provide a safer environment for their users. This is already the case in Kazuramimba and most likely in other beneficiary communities.
- Well-managed and sustainable water services will be more reliable, promote women's empowerment, and contribute to environmental preservation.

These effects have not been measured but are highly probable. Hygiene practices are also likely to have improved due to hygiene and sanitation sensitisation and capacity-building activities, although these efforts have been limited and may not be sustained over time.

# EQ7: What is the likelihood that the final objectives of reducing water related disease could be achieved?

Water quality monitoring indicates that water quality is satisfactory. The project collaborated with the Kigoma Zonal Water Laboratory for water quality monitoring and testing. In several sessions, water samples were collected for laboratory analysis to ensure the quality of drinking water. Additionally, to triangulate results, WASKIRP supplemented the findings from the government laboratory in Kigoma by conducting further analysis in another laboratory in Mwanza.

Although the project's impact on hygiene beyond water quality has not been monitored and is probably not as strong as initially hoped, a positive effect on the reduction of water-related diseases is likely. The baseline study indicated that at the start of the project, there were high incidences of waterborne diseases in the study villages, including bilharzia (13.11%), cholera (8.61%), diarrhoea, dysentery (8.43%), typhoid (20.04%), and scabies (0.37%). Local communities were seriously affected by waterborne diseases, with local leaders identifying the sharing of water points with animals as a major cause of contamination. The highest recorded health condition in all surveyed villages was diarrhoea, while 39% of respondents reported having experienced open defecation in recent years. However, no further monitoring of the prevalence of waterborne diseases was undertaken. As a result, the project's effect on water-related diseases remains unquantified, particularly given that waterborne disease prevalence depends on multiple factors beyond access to clean water, and because the baseline situation was not zero and has not been comprehensively monitored.

As previously mentioned, the absence of support for sanitation infrastructure is a limiting factor from a hygiene and sanitation perspective. This will constrain the project's impact on reducing water-related diseases.

Furthermore, the limited capacity-building efforts related to hygiene make it likely that hygiene practices have not been well assimilated, which will also restrict the project's impact on water-related diseases.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> G. Hutton, Global costs and benefits of drinking-water supply and sanitation interventions to reach the MDG target and universal coverage, World Health Organization, Geneva, 2012, p. 4.: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-HSE-WSH-12.01.

### 3.2 In-depth analysis

3.2.1 EQ1: Taking into consideration the delays accumulated during the first phase of the execution (2018-2021), to what extent have the reviewed and renewed procedures introduced in 2022 been efficient in recovering most of the delays and adjusting the distortions recorded in the implementation?

The post-2022 period has succeeded in completing the construction of the water supply schemes financed by the project. However, despite the changes in the management team (new finance manager and the addition of a contract expert to the team), additional support from Brussels and an improvement in project efficiency, significant delays have persisted. The project has focused almost entirely on infrastructure construction while neglecting capacity strengthening for CBWSOs in operation and maintenance, as well as efforts on catchment protection and hygiene. The project has not, to a sufficiently satisfactory degree, been efficient in recovering delays and adjusting the distortions recorded during its initial phase of implementation.

Identifying exactly how far the reviewed and renewed procedures were effectively introduced in 2022 has been challenging, as none of the people interviewed could describe them with confidence. However, it is recognised that Enabel generally stepped-up efforts concerning stakeholder involvement (RUWASA, communication with local authorities, among other) and that a greater level of participation from RUWASA has been noted, although this was not evident from the ETE's perspective as the regional manager did not respond to the request for a meeting. Another notable change was the recruitment of a new management team following the replacement of the international administrative and finance officer, a much heavier involvement of the Dar es Salaam representation in project oversight and management following the transfer of decision-making authority to the representation, and the eventual replacement of the intervention manager. From mid-2023, the new project team adopted an almost exclusive civil engineering focus, aiming to complete infrastructure in the sites selected after the budget increase in 2021, which was approved in 2022.

Regardless of the new modalities, the ETE considers that although the pace of construction progress improved, they have not been entirely successful in achieving a satisfactory degree of efficiency. Unexpected delays continued, design issues persisted, contractor capacity remained a challenge, and the non-application of VAT exemptions continued to affect the project until the end. Besides, various snags remained in most water supply systems at project closure, and the completion of infrastructure came at the expense of almost entirely setting aside other important project activities, particularly CBWSO strengthening in relation to operation and maintenance (although this was also partly due to the resignation of the social engineer<sup>24</sup> and pressure from Tanzanian authorities). The limited attention given to these activities now presents a significant challenge to the sustainability of the water schemes.

3.2.2 EQ2: To what extent has the decision-making process adopted by Enabel been sufficiently inclusive in taking into account the information provided by staff on the concerns recorded during the first phase of implementation, as well as the views of local partners?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> It emerged subsequently that the project coordinator was on leave until the ETE left and the project closed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> As this occurred 6-month before planned project closure (and no decision as to the extension of the project had then been taken), the social engineer was not replaced.

The decision-making processes adopted by Enabel do not show clear evidence of effectively considering information provided by staff, nor the views of local partners regarding concerns recorded during the first phase of implementation.

Responding to this question has been complicated by the high turnover of both staff and Tanzanian partners, which has resulted in very limited institutional memory within the project. Moreover, the ETE was unable to meet the regional manager from RUWASA, who, on the Tanzanian side, represents the stakeholder with the strongest historical perspective on the project.

Additionally, no formal assessment of the first phase of implementation exists, nor was a Mid-Term Review conducted. The Steering Committee does not appear to have thoroughly analysed the situation either. As a result, there is no consensus on the causes of the project's poor performance.

However, the Country Director now plays a key role in WASKIRP's decision-making processes and has followed the project for longer than most current PIU members. This inherently places him in a strong position to consider concerns from the first phase of implementation.

In terms of inclusiveness, it is recognised that RUWASA has been more involved in decision-making in the latter stages of project implementation. The specific procedures that facilitated this increased involvement include the bi-weekly meetings between the project team (mostly the Project Manager) and RUWASA (the project coordinator). These meetings resulted in increased interaction between Enabel and RUWASA. The direct implementation of some construction work by RUWASA may also have contributed to this shift.

The involvement of other partners, such as CBWSOs, local populations, or private sector actors engaged in the spare parts value chain, has remained weak. This is largely due to the project's strong focus on infrastructure construction rather than the softer aspects of water supply scheme management. As a result, local ownership remains weak.

3.2.3 EQ3: To what extent would the negative effects<sup>25</sup> affecting the overall implementation and performance have been avoided with adequate preventive measures, such as using a meticulous monitoring, risk management and the appointment of staff with highly technical competencies?

The evaluation considers that a more effective monitoring and evaluation system, along with staff possessing stronger technical expertise, would have helped mitigate some of the challenges faced by the WASKIRP project, though not entirely.

#### 3.2.3.1 Monitoring and evaluation

A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system has been severely lacking within the project. In practice, despite the undertaking of a baseline, no M&E system was set up, and project progress measurement has been almost exclusively centred around monitoring activity execution, primarily in relation to infrastructure construction. Furthermore, the management of archives has, in general, been very weak, with the Country Director discovering a significant lack of documentation in late 2022.

However, the issue of information management extends beyond the lack of monitoring of project progress and results. The quality of reporting has been poor, with limited quantification and qualification of results attained and an invariably lenient, overly positive, and uncritical analysis. More generally, the poor quality at entry, which resulted in a severe redesign of the project during

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> External factors such as fiscal changes and institutional reforms, and internal factors such as loss of documentation, among other.

its first year of implementation, indicates that insufficient importance was given to analytical work from the project's formulation stage. The necessary preparatory studies were not undertaken to design the project adequately, and the level of analysis and capitalisation on experience during project implementation has been too superficial.

At the very least, this situation suggests that internal mechanisms for analysing the project's performance and sharing M&E findings between stakeholders were not in place. The intervention has encountered so many challenges and delays that it appears the management team may have avoided conducting a critical analysis for fear of being criticised for the negative situation. The relatively weak partnership between the project team and Tanzanian authorities, which emerged from the vicissitudes that the project put them through, may also explain this reluctance to tackle issues likely to become confrontational. The absence of a mid-term evaluation is indicative of such a situation.

However, the ETE considers that quality control appears to have been inadequate, as there are several issues that should have drawn the attention of the Steering Committee, the country representation, and Enabel headquarters much earlier, irrespective of the existence of a more effective M&E system. Some of these include:

- The leniency in reporting should have been questioned much earlier. Despite significant delays and the emergence of most of the issues outlined in the efficiency chapter—such as cost increases, design flaws, VAT exemption issues, and contractor management capacity—performance in all criteria continued to be marked as good and, in most cases, very good. Moreover, as early as 2020, progress was reported to be nearing completion for various schemes when, in practice, construction works dragged on until the very last month of project implementation in multiple sites. In the 2021 annual report, progress was recorded at 97% for Mwayaya in Buhigwe District, 94% for Mkongoro in Kigoma Rural District, and 95% for Kazuramimba in Uvinza. Only in Kibondo, at Kifura, was a lower completion level of 37% recorded.
- All reports state that "The project was successful on many fronts" or a similar formula, acknowledging the challenges faced (VAT, Covid, Ukraine, elections, euro devaluation, Belgian budgetary revisions) yet still presenting the project's results (albeit below initial expectations) as an achievement in themselves. The reports repeatedly assert that the project was now back on track and would be efficiently implemented from that point onwards.
- Progress reports contain repeated sections and annexes copied from previous reports without being updated.
- One of the only reported results in the first years of the project was the establishment of CBWSOs, yet this is not accompanied by any qualitative analysis of the capacity of these organisations.

Similarly, the existence of a more effective M&E system would not necessarily have mitigated issues related to VAT, contractor administrative weaknesses, or institutional reform.

It should also be noted that RUWASA was expected to conduct more frequent site visits to monitor infrastructure delivery, but it appears they did not do so as often as required. RUWASA claims its visits were ineffective because they were not contractually mandated, meaning there was a tendency to disregard their advice. However, the primary issue appears to have been insufficient time allocated to site supervision and / or a lack of means to do so.

The project also demonstrated an inability to either correctly identify problems or estimate implementation timelines. Reports consistently proposed completion dates that were never met. <sup>26</sup> However, it remains unclear whether a more effective M&E system alone would have resolved the project's broader efficiency challenges.

#### 3.2.3.2 Team composition

Regarding team composition, a higher engineering profile, not necessarily in the role of project manager, would have been beneficial in identifying design issues earlier and sustaining technical discussions with Tanzanian counterparts, implementing partners, and stakeholders about the various civil engineering challenges that arose throughout the project.

However, the team composition was inadequate beyond its civil engineering expertise. Delaying the recruitment of a social engineering officer was presented as a prudent way of managing resources in light of the construction delays encountered. That said, social arrangements concerning water distribution and the responsibilities for operating and maintaining related equipment and infrastructure should be discussed well before infrastructure construction begins. Indeed, discussions among stakeholders about water distribution modalities (quantities, pricing, etc.) should take place prior to construction to guide infrastructure design and ensure proper calibration. In practice, this means that the social engineering officer should have been hired well before construction commenced, not afterwards. It is difficult to assess the extent to which WASKIRP's failure to follow such a participatory process influenced water supply system design and whether it would have resolved some of the design problems encountered.

## 3.2.4 EQ5: To what extent could the new approach of entrusting direct implementation to local partners provide complementary advantages to project performance and sustainability?

Faced with continuous administrative and management challenges, low contractor capacity, a low level of response to bids, and significant construction delays, WASKIRP opted to test a new approach by entrusting RUWASA with the direct implementation of some construction works. This approach was mainly applied in Kakonko.

Direct implementation by local partners is more in line with the Paris principles of alignment, as it places the partner in a leading role. This strengthens ownership and contributes to sustainability. However, opinions differ on its added value and efficiency regarding time and costs.

RUWASA has claimed that the approach is more time- and cost-efficient, largely because the Kakonko scheme was reportedly completed and inaugurated by the Minister of Water over two years ago. Direct implementation is said to save time on procurement, as RUWASA consolidates supplies into larger procurement contracts. In addition, RUWASA claims that it uses its own staff to monitor construction, rather than contracting out to private companies, which enhances agility and facilitates coordination. Nonetheless, this is not totally correct as, in practice, Enabel hired a RUWASA consultant (on RUWASA's advice) to supervise construction, meaning RUWASA cannot really be considered to have undertaken the supervision. Besides, several issues remain, including water pressure problems, leaks, design deficiencies (such as the type of pipes selected), and ongoing work on the system at the time of the ETE. As a result the water system remains only partially functional and has not been less expensive per beneficiary compared to other sites.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> For instance, the 2021 annual result report claims that the Kazuramimba system will be closed by the first quarter of 2022; although, it was not totally finished almost three years later.

In terms of costs, the Kakonko water supply system has been the most expensive scheme, though not in per capita terms. Moreover, despite claims to the contrary, there is no confirmation that costs have been effectively controlled, as some initial invoices were reported to be significantly above market rates. Furthermore, Enabel has noted that the collaboration modalities associated with direct implementation by RUWASA have been highly time-consuming for its team in terms of support and supervision.

As a result, in terms of efficiency, the new approach does not appear to represent an improvement. Moreover, given the remaining uncertainties regarding sustainability due to weak operation and maintenance capacities among local actors, the advantages associated with increased ownership do not appear particularly significant.

Having said this, the partnership between Enabel and RUWASA suffered from the challenges faced by the project. As a result, when direct implementation was decided, the relationship was strained and did not provide an ideal context for collaboration. This could imply that the issue lay in the way and the context in which direct implementation took place, rather than the concept of direct implementation.

# 3.2.5 EQ6: To what extent can the proposed innovation system (such as the one represented by, for example, the GRP tank in Kazuramimba) pose a risk considering the lack of similar materials and/or expertise in the region?

The innovative dimension of the water supply schemes appears to be centred around the Kazuramimba tank. Technically, this innovation is sound. Moreover, expertise related to the tank is not considered a major issue, as other similar tanks exist in Tanzania, albeit smaller in size. One minor drawback is that the relevant expertise is not located in the Kigoma Region, which could limit maintenance capabilities. However, stakeholders consulted consider the maintenance process relatively simple and believe that the necessary capacity will be easy to develop.

However, a more significant risk is associated with the fact that the tank materials (limited to the tank itself, not the supporting structure) must be procured from abroad. Although the cost of tank components is not high, procurement time could present a challenge. The contractor has advised setting aside a reserve of materials to ensure the tank can be maintained promptly when necessary.

# 3.2.6 EQ9: What is the likelihood of water contamination by pesticides and chemical fertilisers used in crops adjacent to the sources where infrastructure has been created? What other negative events, similar to those that have already occurred (economic or fiscal instability, socio-productive or environmental issues), could occur and further damage the products/results obtained?

Risks of water contamination are limited to surface water capture systems. WASKIRP boreholes have all been drilled deep enough to prevent contamination under current levels of pesticide and chemical fertiliser use. $^{27}$ 

For surface water catchment systems, risks primarily stem from human activities near the water source, particularly around the intake. These risks are linked to pollution, particularly from the use of fertilisers and phytosanitary products in agriculture. Risks of siltation have also been observed in some systems, particularly in Mkongoro, where deforestation of the catchment area and agricultural

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Though such levels could increase in the future.

production contribute to sediment accumulation. However, these pose less of a pollution risk compared to direct contamination from agricultural chemicals.

Despite these risks, efforts to protect catchments have been insufficient, and contamination risks persist. Beyond those laid out at a national level, no written by-laws have been produced to establish catchment protection rules for the various CBWSOs responsible for surface water intakes. Additionally, only limited reforestation efforts have been undertaken to reduce erosion and manage surface water flow. To the project's discharge reforestation was out of its scope but one would have expected the subject to be raised more forcefully, possibly leading to tentative planning with LTBWB.

However, national legislation is reportedly adequate, and, as it is part of their mandate, even after the project's conclusion, RUWASA and the LTBWB will continue supporting CBWSOs in protecting catchment areas, thereby safeguarding water sources and minimising pollution risks.

There are positive indications that such measures could be effective. In Mwayaya, efforts have been made to enforce national legislation by preventing agricultural activities near the watercourse from which water is sourced.

It should also be noted that the LTBWB and RUWASA, through the Kigoma water analysis laboratory, conduct quarterly water quality monitoring to assess contamination levels. Based on available data, water contamination is currently insignificant. Furthermore, LTBWB also monitors upstream land use and takes action through village-level environmental management by-laws if pollution risks are identified.

Finally, one must underline that over the past year, in WASKIRP beneficiary communities, joint workforces composed of the village chair, and representatives of LTBWB, CBWSO, RUWASA, and Enabel have been working on catchment protection. Although this work has not had enough time to generate significant impact, participating institutions are reaching a common understanding as to the challenges involved, laying the groundwork for future progress.

## 3.3 Crosscutting issues

#### 3.3.1 Environment and Climate Change

## 3.3.1.1 EQ10: To what extent has the formulation of the project integrated initiatives to prevent environmental degradation and promote climate change mitigation?

The WASKIRP formulation process has integrated initiatives to prevent environmental degradation and promote climate change mitigation to a very limited extent. Indeed, the project document does not go much further than committing to apply the legal and regulatory environmental framework prevailing in Tanzania.

Beyond this framework, apart from stating that "Environment and sustainability will receive special attention during the implementation of the project", the only proactive measure mentioned concerns the fact that "when possible, priority will be given to investment in solar power-driven pumps rather than fossil fuel-driven pumps". Working on catchment protection is also mentioned, but it is not specified whether (and how) this could go beyond applying the legal framework already established by LGA and LTBWB.

## 3.3.1.2 EQ11: To what extent has WASKIRP contributed and/or will it eventually contribute to reducing/preventing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change?

Insofar as the Tanzanian legal environmental framework is adapted to do so, WASKIRP will eventually contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change.

As part of the application of the Tanzanian legal environmental framework, WASKIRP has:

- Conducted an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) for all water supply schemes.
- Supported local institutions in conducting annual flow measurements to ensure that water withdrawals from the Nyete, Kivuruga, and Mkuti rivers, which are the sources for Mkongoro, Mwayaya, and Kifura water schemes respectively, do not place excessive pressure on river flows.
- Carried out water quality testing on these rivers and in groundwater sources.
- Undertaken catchment protection sensitisation with CBWSO.
- Worked with LTBWB to demarcate catchment areas and prepare reforestation plans to limit cultivation and deforestation in the vicinity of water sources and their tributaries, as well as to undertake reforestation activities in accordance with environmental management bylaws formulated at the LGA level.
- Supported Mwayaya CBWSO in prohibiting agricultural activities (and human activities in general) within the buffer zone of 60–100 metres around the water catchment/riverine protection area as part of its catchment protection activities.

However, a set of activities planned to contribute to water catchment protection, which could have further supported greenhouse gas reduction and climate change adaptation, have either not been implemented or have been implemented too partially to be effective.

In particular, the project planned to build capacity within CBWSO to manage their catchment areas sustainably, but this has received very limited attention. Among CBWSOs with surface water intakes, only Mwayaya has conducted catchment protection activities as explained above. Even in the case of Mwayaya, the activities appear limited and do not go beyond applying existing by-laws. No afforestation activities have been conducted.

In practice, reforestation efforts for catchment protection have been minimal. In Kazuramimba, the CBWSO indicated that it had contributed to planting approximately 1,800 trees to protect water resources, but this activity does not appear to have been undertaken within the framework of WASKIRP.

Additionally, no work has been undertaken on by-laws governing water resource protection, despite recommendations from the baseline study.

More generally, it is widely recognised that environmental protection of water sources in the region is ineffective due to limited community sensitisation and the scarce resources of national authorities. In practice, almost no village has developed a land-use plan to regulate its use, and human activities (particularly agriculture) continue within the 60–100 metre buffer zone around water catchments, despite legal prohibitions.

Furthermore, awareness of climate change issues remains low, particularly in relation to how human-induced activities contribute to climate variability and change.

In terms of the project's commitment to prioritising solar power-driven pumps over fossil fuel-driven pumps, progress has been minimal. Most pumping systems are diesel-powered. Only one system is fully solar (Mudyanda); and solar-powered pumps have been introduced marginally in Mkongoro (where they complement the diesel pump) and Kakonko. The current team acknowledges that greater use of solar energy could have been incorporated into the design of some plants, such as

Mwayaya and Kazuramimba. Overall, the goal to focus on solar or sustainable energy was not achieved.

It should also be noted that the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) was conducted in 2021, after most water supply schemes had already commenced construction.

#### 3.3.2 Gender and human rights

3.3.2.1 EQ12: To what extent has the original and reviewed formulation of the WASKIRP been embedded in a human rights-oriented approach and gender responsive strategies, including gender sensitive indicators to be measured upon?

Gender has been considered satisfactorily by the project, although the project document does not lay out an operational strategy to move from consideration to results.

In Kigoma communities, water collection, transportation, storage, and distribution are primarily the responsibility of women and girls, representing a significant burden for them. Schoolgirls, in particular, spend much of their time fetching water for household consumption, often at the expense of their studies. Gender is therefore key to the sustainable management of water supply services in the Kigoma Region. However, women tend to be excluded from decision-making processes and are underrepresented in water committees. Despite being key actors in water collection, their role in the operation and maintenance of water supply schemes is often overlooked.

The intervention aims to have a transformative effect on this situation by ensuring higher, more concrete and operative female representation in CBWSO, thereby increasing their role at the operational level and in the maintenance of water supply systems. It also seeks to potentially extending their participation to the private sector provision of water-related services, particularly in managing public water points, maintaining water schemes and providing spare parts.

Beyond this ambitious objective, the project does not outline a concrete strategy to address gender issues. It merely sets goals for gender representation within CBWSO and applies tools such as a gender budget scan. The latter concludes that 46% of the project's actions are gender-sensitive and 36% are gender-transformative but have a limited effect on gender equity. Specific actions target women or men with the aim of reducing the gender gap (e.g., equal representation in steering committees, strengthening of female leadership) or addressing existing inequalities (e.g., career promotion, salary equity, and working conditions). This latter category implies an effort to change gender relations at political, economic, social, and cultural levels.

However, as previously noted, no transformative gender strategy is presented, and this desire to alter gender relations at political, economic, social, and cultural levels is not based on any analysis of gender dynamics or the determinants of gender inequity. The project merely states that hygiene promotion campaigns, CBWSO governance bodies, and technical assistance to local authorities can be gender-transformative.

While gender is considered at the project formulation stage, human rights are almost entirely unaddressed. The project limits itself to stating that children's rights will be respected by ensuring that no child labour is used in water scheme construction and that water supply will benefit children by relieving them of the burden of water collection.

## 3.3.2.2 EQ13: To what extent has WASKIRP paid sufficient attention to gender and human rights issues during its implementation?

The commendable considerations included in the project proposal regarding gender and human rights have unfortunately only been partially translated into action during implementation.

No child labour appears to have been involved in construction works, but beyond this issue, human rights have not received any attention.

More importantly, given the stated objective of achieving transformative effects on gender, it is disappointing to note that gender has been addressed exclusively through a "quota approach". The project has focused on ensuring that CBWSO water boards integrate at least 30% women, that a majority of women are recruited to manage water distribution points, and that women are well represented within the PIU. Considering the project's stated objectives, its approach to gender should have been stronger and more proactive.

Despite references to a gender analysis, no corresponding document is available. There is no assessment of the roles of men and women in their communities, their needs and priorities concerning water supply and hygiene, their participation in decision-making at household and community levels, or other determinants of gender equity in relation to water supply.

There is no indication that the project has attempted to address the root causes of gender inequity, such as the above mentioned determinants. A PowerPoint presentation used at the 9th JPLC to present WASKIRP's Gender Mainstreaming Strategies exists, but it contains only two superficial slides. These slides merely propose capacity building for women in operation and maintenance and community water management, along with a target of 80% female attendants at distribution points.

As a result, the gender-related effects associated with WASKIRP stem almost entirely from the nature of the issue it addresses, which inherently affects women and girls due to their responsibilities in water collection. In terms of gender equity, WASKIRP's approach offers no added value beyond the issue it tackles.

Women's participation in CBWSO water boards has reached the project's 30% target, as summarised in Table 4.

Table 4: Women participation in CBWSO water boards

Water scheme	Women participation ratio	Percentage	Roles
Kidyama water scheme	3/9	33%	Board chairperson, women representative, health representative
Kifura water scheme	2/9	22%	Women representative and education representative
Kiziguzigu-Kakonko Water scheme	4/9	45%	Women representative, water user's representative and 2 technicians
Mkongoro Gravity-fed Water Supply Scheme	3/9	33%	Women representative, education representative and accountant
Mwayaya Pumping Water Supply Scheme	2/9	22%	Women representative and water user's representative

Water scheme	Women participation ratio	Percentage	Roles
Kazuramimba Water Supply Scheme	3/9	33%	Women representative, water user's representative and accountant
Total	17/54	31,5%	

However, there is no assessment of the actual influence women exert within these boards and of their effective empowerment. Additionally, it is doubtful whether female presence in a water board alone has a significant gender-transformative effect.

### 4 Conclusions

The main findings of this ETE lead to the following conclusions:

## 4.1 Conclusions concerning efficiency

Conclusion 1: WASKIRP has provided clean water and improved sanitation and hygiene practices for over 200,000 people at a relatively high per capita cost. It has met its quantitative targets but, due to a wide variety of issues, has been affected by severe delays and significant cost increases. It closed 2.5 years after the initially planned date and required a 50% budget increase to achieve its results. It was still finalising construction at the time of the ETE, with some works to be completed in the weeks following project closure. The effects of the hygiene-related activities have not been monitored and remain limited. A phase-out has had to be included in Enabel's 2023–2027 Country Portfolio for Tanzania to support the consolidation of operation and maintenance aspects.

The issues faced have been both contextual—bad weather, weak contractor management capacity, Covid, the Ukraine crisis, Belgian budgetary revisions, water sector reform, election periods, and periods of staff turnover in both Tanzanian and Belgian institutions—and internal, including VAT exemption delays, complicated administrative processes, design deficiencies, and weak financial and administrative management.

<u>Conclusion 2</u>: Insufficient importance has been given to analytical work. From the project's formulation stage, the necessary preparatory studies (water scheme situation, CBWSO capacity, local institutional capacities, number of beneficiaries, water availability, etc.) were not undertaken to design the project adequately, and quality at entry was very low. Beyond the initial formulation phase, the level of subsequent project design, analysis, and capitalisation of experience during implementation has been too superficial. This led to repeated design deficiencies, redesigns, and time-consuming contract amendments.

<u>Conclusion 3</u>: A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was lacking. Despite undertaking a baseline study, an effective M&E system was never put in place. Delays resulted in M&E being disregarded when, on the contrary, it should have served as a tool to reorientate the project, analyse its performance, and fine-tune implementation procedures. Internal mechanisms for analysing project performance were not established, and even the mid-term evaluation was cancelled. Furthermore, due to deficient reporting, quality control was low, and oversight bodies (SC, Enabel representation, and headquarters) were late in recognising the scale of the challenges faced by the project and in initiating appropriate backstopping measures.

<u>Conclusion 4</u>: Engineering capacity was lacking within the team. Design problems persisted even after the deficiencies in the initial assessment were identified. A stronger engineering profile, not necessarily at project management level, would have been useful in identifying design issues more rapidly, sustaining technical conversations with Tanzanian counterparts, implementing partners, and stakeholders, and making decisions concerning the various civil engineering issues that arose throughout project implementation.

<u>Conclusion 5</u>: Beyond implementation modalities, the quality of a partnership is key to project efficiency. A lack of solidarity between partners, such as the one that has emerged between Enabel and RUWASA, only worsens problems. When facing challenges, a common and consensual analysis of their causes should be sought.

## 4.2 Conclusions concerning effectiveness

<u>Conclusion 6</u>: The capacity-building activities were too irregular and stretched over a long period to be effective. Capacity building was sporadically implemented throughout WASKIRP's 7.5 implementation period, with no continuity and minimal linkage to functioning water systems (which only became fully operational in the last year of the project, when no capacity building activities were developed). As a result, CBWSOs and other beneficiaries have assimilated very little.

<u>Conclusion 7:</u> Focusing solely on water supply without incorporating sanitation infrastructure limits hygiene and sanitation-related results. This has constrained the project's impact on reducing water-related diseases, which nonetheless will exist (though it is unquantified).

## 4.3 Conclusions concerning sustainability

Conclusion 8: Beneficiaries' capacity to operate and maintain the water supply schemes is insufficient, leading to low sustainability. The project has largely focused on infrastructure, with insufficient attention given to operation and maintenance. CBWSOs require further capacity building. They still lack both administrative and technical capacity, resulting in weak management of water schemes. They can only be considered partially functional. CBWSOs still require significant support in governance, human resources, data management, sustainable financing, developing and implementing effective operations and management plans, and water protection. No CBWSO appears to have a proper business plan in place, and their offices lack equipment beyond basic furniture. They also have very limited registers, if any. Ownership remains limited. Furthermore, RUWASA requires further capacity building to effectively fulfil its mandate in supporting CBWSOs. Spare parts supply chains are poorly developed, and private sector involvement in the sector remains low.

<u>Conclusion 9:</u> Limited work has been undertaken on catchment protection. Only a few CBWSOs have been involved in catchment protection work. Even where activities have been carried out, they have not been sufficient to ensure effective protection of a catchment's water resources.

Conclusion 10: It is doubtful that the phase-out project has sufficient resources to undertake all the necessary consolidation work. The EUR 438,000 phase-out project included in Enabel's 2023—2027 Country Portfolio for Tanzania may support the consolidation of operation and maintenance aspects. However, much remains to be done, and the evaluation team does not believe the financial resources currently allocated to the phase-out will be sufficient to comprehensively resolve all pending issues. Furthermore, no clear phase-out document outlining its exact scope exists, and, outside Enabel, knowledge of the phase-out project was very limited.

## 4.4 Conclusions concerning cross-cutting issues

<u>Conclusion 11</u>: The project has not addressed the root causes of gender inequity. No transformative gender strategy has been put forward, and the stated objective of changing gender relations at the political, economic, social, and cultural levels is not based on any analysis of gender relations or the corresponding determinants of gender inequity. No assessment of the roles of men and women in their communities, their needs and priorities regarding water supply and hygiene, their participation in decision-making at household and community levels, or further determinants of gender equity in relation to water supply is available. It is disappointing to note that gender has been tackled exclusively through a "quota approach".

Nonetheless, it must be underlined that the provision of safe water has significant benefits, particularly in reducing the workload of women and girls, who spend a considerable amount of time fetching water for their families.

## 5 Recommendations

The recommendations are based on the above conclusions. They address the main points of attention identified by the mission but are not exhaustive. They are listed in order of priority and mostly concern the evaluation criteria that have been considered problematic: the project's efficiency and sustainability. However, recommendations concerning effectiveness and gender are also included.

Recommendation 1	Related conclusion(s)	Targeted actors	Level*	Priority	Туре
1. Develop a clear phase-out	6, 8, 9, and	Enabel,	1 and	Short	Operational
document with RUWASA, based on	10	RUWASA	2	term	
a clear and honest assessment of					
the current CBWSO and RUWASA					
capacities to manage, operate and					
maintain water supply schemes;					
and prioritise activities according to					
the available budget.					

<sup>\*</sup> Level 1 - Project/Programme: Recommendations that fall within the sphere of control of the project or programme team(s) and implementing partners.

This recommendation seeks to reconcile the fact that CBWSO capacity building needs are numerous while the current resources within the phase-out project included in the 2023–2027 Country Programme for Tanzania appear too limited to cover them. Rather than proceed with the current plans, which lack detail and comprehensiveness, it is suggested to develop a shared vision of CBWSO capacity-building needs with RUWASA. These include administrative needs (business plans, water tariff calculation, governance, human resources, registers and data management, financing, operations, and management plans), technical needs (water supply scheme management, catchment area protection, and water quality), and logistical needs (office equipment, vehicles, etc.).

Level 2 - Representation/country: Recommendations that fall within the sphere of control of Enabel's representation in the partner country (Enabel's strategy in the country, political dialogue with the partner, etc.) or of the institutional partner.

Level 3 - Organisational Enabel: Recommendations which engage the sphere of control of the Enabel Management Committee and/or actions required at the transversal level of the organisation.

Level 4 - Overall cooperation framework (DGD/Cabinet/SEO/UE): Recommendations that engage the sphere of control of the donor (Belgian or other) and/or the overall framework of Belgian cooperation (DGD, ministry, etc.).

Such an output should be integrated into the phase-out project document and subsequently constitute the basis of the CBWSO capacity-building plan.

Capacity-building needs within RUWASA should also be determined, as well as the strategy and/or policy regarding the development of the spare parts supply chain and the involvement of the private sector in water supply.

Though this issue should be included in capacity building, catchment protection activities should be entrusted to RUWASA and LTBWB, as the remaining resources for the phase-out project are insufficient to do more.

Recommendation 2	Related conclusion(s)	Targeted actors	Level*	Priority	Туре
2. In future projects, prioritise operation and maintenance of infrastructure throughout the project cycle, from design to support of its operation.	8 and 9	Enabel, RUWASA	2 and 3	Short term	Strategic

<sup>\*</sup> Refer to the footnote in the Recommendation 1 box for a description of the level.

The lack of attention given to operation and management is the main cause of the project's weak sustainability. At various stages of the project, it was considered either that infrastructure construction was not advanced enough to work on the operation of the water supply schemes or that priority should be given to construction due to the risk of not completing all the civil engineering works.

The strategic decision to focus on completing infrastructure is understandable from a reputational risk mitigation perspective but is questionable from a sustainability standpoint. Furthermore, as some schemes have been at least partly operational since 2022, more resources should have been redirected to CBWSO capacity building. This weakness will likely only be partly compensated by the phase-out. A much more robust capacity-building plan directed towards CBWSO should have been formulated and implemented during the project's initial implementation period.

Additionally, it is essential to involve local populations and discuss water-sharing and management modalities at the design stage of a water system. Indeed, discussions among stakeholders on water distribution modalities (quantities, pricing, etc.) should take place before construction to guide the infrastructure design and ensure it is appropriately calibrated. In practice, this implies that the social engineering officer should have been hired well before works began, not afterwards. This approach accounts for both technical and social contextual specificities while fostering ownership of the water scheme.

This recommendation also extends to necessary work on catchment protection, for similar reasons.

Recommendation 3	Related	Targeted actors	Level*	Priority	Туре
	conclusion(s)				

3. Develop M&E systems with	3 and 5	Enabel (HQ,	1,2	Long	Operational
local counterparts, but		Country	(and	term	
beyond the individual project		representation	3)		
level, to review progress and		and RUWASA)			
serve as a project					
management tool, allowing					
for performance monitoring					
and implementation					
processes adjustments.					

<sup>\*</sup> Refer to the footnote in the Recommendation 1 box for a description of the level.

Irrespective of monitoring progress, the lack of a functional M&E system has affected the project's capacity to identify the issues that have hindered its implementation. More attention should have been given to M&E, despite (and in fact because of) the implementation challenges encountered. Although WASKIRP's initial results were limited, an M&E system should have incorporated internal mechanisms for analysing project performance (including administrative and financial aspects) and clearer mechanisms to trigger backstopping support when deficiencies were noted. This would likely have supported the maintenance of a good relationship between project implementing partners, as it would have helped identify the causes of inefficiencies and reach a common analysis of these causes. This implies that M&E should be articulated at the country level (or beyond). Basic elements of an M&E system, such as an MTR, should be maintained, regardless of a project's status.

In complement to data collection and analysis, more attention should be given to reporting modalities, reporting tools and archiving. It appears that Enabel's Tanzania team has already identified this as a gap and, since 2024, has employed a national M&E expert based in Dar es Salaam, who follows up on all the projects. This recommendation should build on that existing initiative.

Recommendation 4	Related conclusion(s)	Targeted actors	Level*	Priority	Туре
4. Prioritise analytical work (including concerning gender) at the	1, 2, 3 and 11	Enabel	1, 2 and 3	Medium term	Strategic
formulation stage and during implementation, aligning it with M&E to ensure adequate design, strategic robustness and			and 3	term	
adaptability.					

<sup>\*</sup> Refer to the footnote in the Recommendation 1 box for a description of the level.

The poor quality at entry, which set the project off to a difficult start, was the result of a superficial identification process and a lack of contextual analysis. To some extent, this issue persisted during later stages of implementation, with key studies (gender analysis, MTR) not being undertaken. It could also be argued that the challenging socio-political context should have been given greater consideration.

Although costly, it is essential that projects take the time to assess situations thoroughly and plan accordingly. In the case of gender, despite ambitious objectives, if a gender study was conducted, it appears to have been entirely superficial and not aligned with the project's gender-transformative aims, which require a detailed understanding of gender relations from a socio-cultural perspective.

More detailed contextual analysis, both at the formulation stage and during implementation, could also have supported the development of appropriate mitigation strategies for contextual challenges, such as weak contractor management capacity, weather-related obstacles, access to work areas, or socio-political conflicts.

Recommendation 5	Related	Targeted	Level*	Priority	Туре
	conclusion(s)	actors			
5. When operating in complex	1 and 5	Enabel	1 and	Medium	Operational
socio-political and administrative		and	2	term	
contexts, develop a network of		project			
contacts, including at high level,		teams			
as a mitigation strategy to					
minimise any possible					
administrative obstacles and /or					
local problematic situations.					

<sup>\*</sup> Refer to the footnote in the Recommendation 1 box for a description of the level.

When confronted with VAT exemption issues, on at least two occasions, the situation was unblocked by a private secretary (PS) at the ministerial level. This demonstrates how cultivating a network of high-level contacts can help resolve problems more rapidly. There is a need for country representations and project teams to engage at multiple levels of hierarchy (district, regional, national) and with a range of actors (RUWASA, Commissioners, Ministries, TRA, etc.), ideally including representatives from all political sides and influential high-level partners who can intervene when problems arise. Developing strong relationships or partnerships with such a network of stakeholders can be crucial when projects face complex administrative and socio-political issues.

Recommendation 6	Related conclusion(s)	Targeted actors	Level*	Priority	Туре
6. Ensure that capacity-building efforts are regular, substantial and articulated with other project activities to maximise results.	6	Enabel and RUWASA	1	Short term	Operational

<sup>\*</sup> Refer to the footnote in the Recommendation 1 box for a description of the level.

When stretched over a long period, delivered irregularly, and undertaken without functional water systems, capacity-building activities are ineffective. It is essential to make sure that capacity building is closely linked to practical application in an adapted context, meaning that it is preferable to undertake it based on the functional infrastructure that beneficiaries will inherit. Moreover, to ensure the close attention of beneficiaries, it is best to carry out capacity building within a limited timeframe, notwithstanding future needs for refresher training.

Recommendation 7	Related conclusion(s)	Targeted actors	Level*	Priority	Туре
7. When engaged in civil works, ensure that necessary engineering capacity is available to monitor and support implementation regularly.	4	Enabel and RUWASA	1	Short term	Operational

<sup>\*</sup> Refer to the footnote in the Recommendation 1 box for a description of the level.

A more senior engineer should have supported the PIU to limit design deficiencies, improve the quality of dialogue with RUWASA and contractors, and strengthen overall project implementation. When working with a technical partner which still requires a degree of capacity building, it is essential to ensure that adequate technical capacity exists within the project implementation team. This ensures the ability to conduct regular, high-quality technical exchanges, not only for the efficient execution of the project but also to build the partner's capacity.

Recommendation 8	Related conclusion(s)	Targeted actors	Level*	Priority	Туре
8. To maximise health and hygiene impact, associate water supply infrastructure with sanitation infrastructure in water supply projects.	7	Enabel	2 and 3	Medium- term	Strategic

<sup>\*</sup> Refer to the footnote in the Recommendation 1 box for a description of the level.

The absence of support for sanitation infrastructure (particularly latrines) is a limiting factor from both hygiene and sanitation perspectives. Although this clearly has budgetary implications, sanitation infrastructure should systematically be linked to water supply in future projects.

## 6 Lessons learned

EQ4: What are the main lessons learnt identified and which one can be considered good practices that can be adopted in similar intervention in the future?

<u>Lesson 1</u>: Developing a spirit of co-management is key to the quality of an implementing partnership and matters more than the implementation modalities in determining a project's performance.

Direct implementation by local partners obviously aligns better with the Paris principles of alignment, as it places the partner in the driving seat. This strengthens ownership and contributes to sustainability. However, ultimately, the quality of a partnership, rather than its official modalities (direct implementation, co-management, etc.), is the strongest determinant of an intervention's performance. It is particularly important that an intervention be implemented in a spirit of co-management, with the effective application of the principles of co-responsibility and co-decision.

<u>Lesson 2</u>: There is a risk that the desire to develop a healthy partnership and demonstrate satisfactory progress in an intervention leads to excessive leniency towards a partner's

**deficiencies**; in such cases, higher levels of hierarchy (steering committee, Enabel headquarters, diplomatic delegations) must step in to resolve the issue.

It is in the interest of project teams and implementing partners to demonstrate the success of the work they undertake. This can lead to the minimisation of challenges and tensions, particularly when the quality of a partnership is central to an endeavour's success. Projects and programmes must ensure that the necessary mechanisms (M&E, team dialogue, etc.) are in place to enable the project's hierarchy to be alerted in such situations, which are inherently sensitive as they may imply a shift in responsibility.

<u>Lesson 3:</u> There is a need to communicate at multiple levels of hierarchy (district, regional, national) and with a selection of actors (RUWASA, Commissioners, Ministries, TRA, etc.), ideally including all "political" sides, when problems arise.

Local authorities, as well as higher administrative levels, must be kept informed. When conflicts arise, it is important that the regional management apparatus is aware of developments in case the Ministry or central level calls upon them.

<u>Lesson 4</u>: Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) should not be limited to monitoring activities and results; it must also serve as a tool to reorient a project, analyse its performance, and fine-tune its implementation procedures. Besides, attention should be given to capacity building of project stakeholders to ensure that monitoring tools are applied correctly.

<u>Lesson 5:</u> When a project has to be significantly reoriented, it is best to take a step back and allow for time to analyse and reassess the situation. Indeed, following initial assessment of weaknesses or significant contextual changes, in line with conclusion 2 and recommendation 4 on the importance of analytical work, a thorough reassessment should be conducted, recognising the need to remain open to a substantial reformulation of corresponding activities, agendas and objectives - rather than adhering to original indicators and timeframes and attempting to adapt to previous plans and institutional agreements. This is key to the project's efficiency and effectiveness.